


AWA'IL AL-MAQALAT

fi al-Madhahib wa al-Mukhtarat

*The Earliest Doctrinal Treatises on the Schools of Thought and
the Selected Positions*



Shaykh Al-Mufeed

Awa'il al-Maqalat fi al-Madhahib wa al-Mukhtarat

*The Earliest Doctrinal Treatises on the Schools of Thought
and the Selected Positions*

Authored by

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(d. 413 AH)

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Introduction of Translator

In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate.

All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds. Peace and blessings be upon Muḥammad and his pure progeny, the Ahl al-Bayt (as).

Thereafter, the sinful servant of Allah, Sarim Jafri, says:

I present to the reader this English translation of the book *Awā'il al-Maqālāt fī al-Madhāhib wa-l-Mukhtārāt*, authored by Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Nu'mān al-Ḥārithī al-'Ukbarī al-Baghdādī, famously known as Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413 AH).

This work is among the foundational theological texts of the Imāmī school. In it, Shaykh al-Mufīd systematically presents early doctrinal positions (maqālāt) of the Imāmiyya, clarifies points of agreement and disagreement with other Islamic schools, and identifies the views he considers to be correct (al-mukhtār). The book addresses major theological issues such as faith (īmān) and unbelief (kufr), divine justice ('adl), human action, divine aid (luṭf), abrogation (naskh), prophethood, Imāmah, and related doctrinal principles, reflecting the methodology of the early Imāmī scholars and the rational-textual balance characteristic of their approach.

My sole intention in translating this book is to make the knowledge of this great scholar accessible to a wider audience, especially those who do not have direct access to the Arabic original. This translation has been carried out with my limited understanding of the Arabic language and with the assistance of AI tools. Despite sincere effort to avoid mistakes and remain faithful to the original text, errors may still exist. If there is any mistake, it is from myself, and I seek forgiveness from Allah for it. Whatever is correct is from Allah alone.

I ask Allah, the Exalted, to accept this humble effort, to overlook its shortcomings, and to bless us all with beneficial and abundant knowledge.

Allah, exalted is He, says:

“And say: ‘My Lord, increase me in knowledge.’” (Qur'ān 20:114)

And all praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds.

- Sarim Jafri

Introduction of Author

In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the All-Compassionate.

I praise Allah for His blessing, and I seek refuge in Him from opposing Him and disobeying Him. I seek protection in Him from His wrath and His retribution. And may Allah send blessings upon the choicest of His creation, Muḥammad, His Prophet (saww), and upon the pure and righteous elect from his progeny, and may He grant them abundant peace.

To proceed: may Allah prolong the life of our master, the noble *naqīb*, in the honor of obedience to Him, may He perpetuate his establishment and the exaltation of his word. Indeed, by the success and will of Allah, I have set down in this book that whose establishment has been transmitted concerning the distinctions between the Shī'a and the Mu'tazila; and the delineation between the 'Adliyya among the Shī'a and those who uphold justice among the Mu'tazila; and the differences between them thereafter and between the Imāmiyya regarding that upon which they are agreed concerning their disagreement with them in foundational principles.

I also mention, at the root of that, what I myself have selected from the doctrines branching out from the principles of *tawḥīd* and 'adl, and the discussion of *al-laṭīf* from theology ('ilm al-kalām); and that which accords therein with Banū Nawbakht — may Allah have mercy upon them and that which differs from their views in doctrine; and that which agrees with their position from among the people of i'tizāl and others from the theologians, so that it may be an established foundation relied upon in examining matters of belief.

And in Allah I seek help for the facilitation of that, and He, by His grace, is the One who grants success to correctness.

1 — Chapter on the Discourse Concerning the Distinction between the Shī‘a, by virtue of what they are ascribed to from tashayyu‘, and the Mu‘tazila, by virtue of that through which they deserved the name of i‘tizāl

Sincerity. Allah (swt) has said: “*So the one who was from his Shī‘a sought his help against the one who was from his enemy*” (Qur’ān 28:15). Thus He distinguished between the two in name by what He informed of the difference between them in *wilāyah* and enmity, and He made the cause of tashayyu‘ for one of them to be loyalty, by explicit mention of it in the discourse. And Allah (swt) has said: “*And indeed, among his Shī‘a was Ibrāhīm*” (Qur’ān 37:83), thereby granting him the designation of being among the followers of Nūḥ (as) by way of loyalty.

From this usage is their saying: “So-and-so spoke regarding such-and-such, and so-and-so *shayya‘a* his speech,” when he affirms him therein and follows him in its meanings. From this sense it is said of one who follows a traveler to bid him farewell: “He is a *mushayyi‘* of him.” However, not every one who *mushayyi‘*s another, in the true sense we mentioned of following, deserves the designation of tashayyu‘, nor does the application of the term “al-Shī‘a” fall upon him, whether his leader is right or false, unless the sign of definiteness the *alif* and *lām* is removed from it, and it is annexed with the partitive term *min*, so that it is said: “These are from the Shī‘a of Banū Umayyah,” or “from the Shī‘a of Banū al-‘Abbās,” or “from the Shī‘a of so-and-so.” As for when the sign of definiteness is introduced into it, then it is necessarily by way of specification for the followers of Amīr al-Mu‘minīn may Allah’s blessings be upon him by way of loyalty and belief in his Imāmah after the Messenger may Allah’s blessings be upon him and his family without interval, and the negation of the Imāmah from those who preceded him in the station of the caliphate, and by making him, in belief, one whom they follow, not a follower of any of them in any manner of emulation.

That which indicates the soundness of this is the common usage of all people and their established convention in its unrestricted application, and the knowledge of every addressee of the speaker’s intent by it in specifying this group to the exclusion of others who claim its entitlement among its opponents, according to what we have explained. Likewise, custom

understands the speaker's intent by the unqualified mention of Islām, and by the mention of ḥanīfiyyah, īmān, ṣalāh, zakāh, ḥajj, and ṣawm, even though these names, in the original language, did not convey what the Sharī'ah established and what convention judged in them by way of clarification.

This is made even clearer by the agreement that has occurred regarding the Khārijites being stripped of this designation and excluded from its entitlement, and the ignorance of one who applies it to them with the *alif* and *lām*, even though they were followers of Abū Bakr and 'Umar by way of loyalty. Likewise, those of Baṣrah, the followers of Mu'āwiyah, and those who refrained from aiding Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) were excluded from its entitlement, even though they were followers of leaders of guidance according to the people of opposition, and while manifesting the abandonment of enmity toward him along with their abandonment [of support]. By this consideration it becomes known that the designation of tashayyu' is a proper name ('*alam*') for the group we have mentioned, even though its original meaning in the language is what we described of following just as Islām is a proper name for the community of Muḥammad (saww) specifically, even though in the original language it is a name to which the Jews are entitled by their submission to Mūsā (as), and the Christians are entitled to it by the like, and the Magians are entitled to it by their submission to Zardusht; and every one who submits to another is entitled to it according to the meaning of the language. Yet they were excluded from its entitlement once it became a proper name for the community of Muḥammad (saww), and it was specified for it to the exclusion of others by convention and usage. This amount suffices for what we have established, even though its explanation could be expanded and the proofs would mutually reinforce ; however, we have turned away from that due to what we intend of the objective elsewhere, and we have devoted a separate treatise to it in which we have exhausted the discussion.

When what we have clarified regarding the designation of tashayyu' is established as we have described, it necessarily applies to the Imāmiyyah and the Zaydiyyah al-Jārūdiyyah, to the exclusion of the rest of the sects of the community, due to their being ordered by its meaning and attaining its cause. They have not departed from it, even if they add to it agreement among themselves or disagreement in various aspects of doctrinal matters. The Mu'tazila, the Bakriyyah, the Khārijites, and the Ḥashwiyyah are excluded from it due to their being devoid of its meaning which we have described, and

agreement with one for whom it is obligatory in other respects did not admit them into it, whoever that may be.

As for the Mu‘tazila, and that by which they were marked with the name of i‘tizāl, it is a designation that arose for them at the time of the doctrine of *al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn*, and what Wāṣil b. ‘Aṭā’ innovated in that doctrine and the establishment of argumentation for it. ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd followed him, and those who professed it agreed with him in adopting it as religion. They both followed it to the point of withdrawing from al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and his companions and separating from his circle. Thus people called them the Mu‘tazila for their withdrawal from the gathering of al-Ḥasan after having been among its people, and for their singularity in what they adopted in this issue from among the entirety (11) of the community and all the scholars. Before that, i‘tizāl was not known, nor was it a proper name for any group of people.

Thus, whoever agrees with the Mu‘tazila in what they hold regarding *al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn* is truly a Mu‘tazilī, even if he adds to that agreement with others from among the people of opinions, and the name of i‘tizāl predominates over him; and his adherence to beliefs not held by the majority of them does not remove him from it.

Likewise, the name of tashayyu‘ is deserved, and predominates, for one who professes the Imāmah of Amīr al-Mu‘minīn (as) according to what we have set forth, even if he adds to that beliefs which many of the Shī‘a reject and repudiate. Similarly, Ḍirār b. ‘Amr was a Mu‘tazilī even though he professed createdness and quiddity in opposition to the majority of the people of i‘tizāl; and Hishām b. al-Ḥakam was a Shī‘ī even though he opposed all of the Shī‘a regarding the Names of Allah (swt) and what he adopted concerning the meanings of the attributes.

2 — Chapter on the Distinction between the Imāmiyyah and others among the Shī‘a, and the rest of the adherents of doctrinal positions

As for the designation of the doctrine by *Imāmah*, and the description of a group among the Shī‘a as *Imāmiyyah*, it is a proper name (‘*alam*) for those who profess the obligation of the Imāmah and its existence in every age, who affirm explicit designation (*al-naṣṣ al-jalī*), infallibility (‘*iṣmah*), and perfection for every Imām, and who then confine the Imāmah to the descendants of al-Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī (as), and carry it forward to al-Riḍā ‘Alī b. Mūsā (as). For although, in its origin, it was a general designation for those who adhered, in principles, to what we have mentioned without specification of particular individuals as we have described, it nevertheless departed from its original sense due to certain factions among its adherents deserving specific appellations by virtue of reports attributed to them and doctrines they innovated, such that those appellations came to predominate over them in usage instead of the description “Imāmiyyah.” Thus this name, in the convention of the theologians and others among the jurists and the general public, became a proper name for those we have mentioned.

As for the Zaydiyyah, they are those who affirm the Imāmah of Amīr al-Mu‘minīn ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn, and Zayd b. ‘Alī (as), and who affirm the Imāmah of every Fāṭimī who calls to himself while manifestly just, possessing knowledge and courage, and whose allegiance is taken upon unsheathing the sword for jihād.

3— Chapter on That Regarding Which the Imāmiyyah Are United in Opposition to the Mu‘tazila, Concerning What They Have Agreed upon in the Doctrine of the Imāmah

The people of the Imāmah are agreed that, in every age, there must necessarily be an existing Imām by whom Allah (swt) establishes proof against His morally responsible servants, and that by his existence the completeness of benefit in religion is realized. The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon

the opposite of this, permitting the existence of long periods devoid of an existing Imām. In this view, the Khārijites, the Zaydiyyah, the Murji'ah, and the general populace affiliated with the people of ḥadīth have shared with them, and have opposed the Imāmiyyah therein.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Imām of religion can only be one who is infallible (*ma ṣūm*) from opposition to Allah, (swt); fully knowledgeable of all the sciences of religion; complete in virtue; and distinct from all others by superiority over them in deeds by which everlasting bliss is deserved. The Mu'tazila, along with those sects we have mentioned that fall outside the designation of the Imāmiyyah, have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, and have permitted that the Imāms may be sinners inwardly, may commit acts of disobedience, may lack virtue, and may be deficient in the sciences of religion.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Imāmah, in the absence of a manifest miracle on behalf of its claimant, is not established except by explicit designation (*al-naṣṣ*) to his person and by authoritative appointment (*tawqīf*). The Mu'tazila, the Khārijites, the Zaydiyyah, the Murji'ah, and those labeled as the people of ḥadīth have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, and have permitted the Imāmah for one who has no miracle, no explicit designation, and no authoritative appointment.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Imāmah after the Prophet (saww) is confined exclusively to Banū Hāshim; then to 'Alī, al-Ḥasan, and al-Ḥusayn; and thereafter to the descendants of al-Ḥusayn (as), to the exclusion of the descendants of al-Ḥasan peace be upon them both until the end of the world. The Mu'tazila and the other sects we have mentioned have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. All of them, except the Zaydiyyah in particular, have permitted the Imāmah outside Banū Hāshim, while the Zaydiyyah have permitted it outside the descendants of al-Ḥusayn (as).

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Messenger of Allah (saw) appointed Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) as his successor during his lifetime and explicitly designated him for the Imāmah after his death, and that whoever rejects this has rejected an obligation of religion. The Mu'tazila, the Khārijites, the Murji'ah, the Batriyyah, and the Ḥashwiyyah affiliated with the people of ḥadīth have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, denying the Prophet's (saww) explicit designation of Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), and rejecting that the Imām after him was appointed immediately over the Muslims without interval.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Prophet (saww) explicitly designated al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn for the Imāmah after Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), and that Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) likewise designated them, just as the Messenger (saww) had designated them. The Mu'tazila and the other sects we have enumerated except the Zaydiyyah al-Jārūdiyyah have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, denying that al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (as) possessed the Imāmah by explicit designation and authoritative appointment.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Messenger of Allah (saww) explicitly designated 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn, and that his father and grandfather likewise designated him, just as the Messenger (saww) had designated him, and that by this he was the Imām of the believers. The Mu'tazila, the Khārijites, the Zaydiyyah, the Murji'ah, and those affiliated with the people of ḥadīth have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, all together denying that 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn (as) was an Imām for the community in the manner by which the Imāmah is established for any of the Imāms of the Muslims.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Imāms after the Messenger (saww) are twelve Imāms, and every other group among the people of the religion has opposed them in this. Their proofs for this, in opposition to the majority, are manifest by way of rational analogy, accepted transmitted evidence, and clear demonstration, adherence to which leads to certainty.

4— Discourse Concerning Those Who Preceded Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as)

The Imāmiyyah and many of the Zaydiyyah are agreed that those who preceded Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) are misguided and sinful, and that by delaying Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) from the station of the Messenger of Allah (saww) they were disobedient and unjust, and that by their injustice they shall abide eternally in the Fire.

The Mu'tazila, the Khārijites, a group among the Zaydiyyah, the Murji'ah, and the Ḥashwiyyah have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They professed loyalty to those people, claimed that they did not withhold any right

from Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), and asserted that they are among the people of bliss except for the Khārijites and a group of the Zaydiyyah, who dissociated themselves from 'Uthmān in particular, claiming that he is eternally abiding in Hellfire due to his innovations in religion, not because of his precedence over Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as).

5— Discourse Concerning Those Who Waged War against Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as)

The Imāmiyyah, the Zaydiyyah, and the Khārijites are agreed that the *Nākiṭūn* and the *Qāsiṭūn* from among the people of Baṣrah and al-Shām, all of them, are unbelieving, misguided, and accursed, against whom Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) fought; and that by virtue of this they shall abide eternally in the Fire. The Mu'tazila except al-Ghazzālī among them and Ibn Bāb as well as the Murji'ah and the Ḥashwiyyah from among the people of ḥadīth, have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this.

The Mu'tazila as a whole except those whom we have named together with a group of the Murji'ah and a faction among the people of ḥadīth, claimed that they were sinners (*fussāq*), not unbelievers. Among them, the Mu'tazila decisively held that, due to their sinfulness, they shall abide eternally in the Fire.

The remaining Murji'ah and the people of ḥadīth said that they do not deserve the designation of unbelief or sinfulness. Some among these two groups said that they were *mujtahids* in their war against Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), obedient to Allah thereby, and rewarded for it. Others said, rather, that they were disobedient to Allah (swt) yet they were not sinners, nor can it be decisively held that they are deserving of punishment.

Wāṣil al-Ghazzāl and 'Amr b. 'Ubayd b. Bāb, from among all the Mu'tazila, claimed that Ṭalḥah, al-Zubayr, 'Ā'ishah, and those who were in their camp, as well as 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (as), al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn (as), and Muḥammad, and those who were in their camp such as 'Ammār b. Yāsir and others among the Muhājirīn, the leading figures of the Anṣār, and the remaining participants of the Pledge of Riḍwān, were, in their disagreement, like mutually cursing parties; and that one of the two groups were sinful, misguided, and deserving

of eternal abode in the Fire except that no proof was established specifying which of the two it was.

The Imāmiyyah, the Zaydiyyah, and a group among the people of ḥadīth are agreed that the Khārijites who rebelled against Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), who deviated from the religion, are unbelievers by virtue of their rebellion against him, and that by this they shall abide eternally in the Fire.

The Mu'tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They forbade declaring them unbelievers and restricted their designation to sinfulness (*tafsīq*), while obligating for them eternal abode in Hellfire.

The Murji'ah and the remaining people of ḥadīth claimed that they are sinners concerning whom punishment is feared and forgiveness and reward are hoped for, and [that they may attain] entrance into the Gardens of bliss.

6 — Discourse on the Designation of Those Who Deny the Imāmah and Reject the Obedience and That Which Allah (swt) Has Made Obligatory for the Imāms as a Binding Duty

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that whoever denies the Imāmah of any one of the Imāms and rejects that which Allah (swt) has made obligatory for them in the form of the duty of obedience is an unbeliever, misguided, and deserving of eternal abiding in the Fire. The Mu'tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this: they denied the unbelief of those we have mentioned, judged some of them to be sinful specifically, and judged others to be guilty of disobedience falling short of sinfulness.

7— Discourse on the Fact that Reason (*'aql*) Is Never Independent of Transmission (*sam'*), and that Obligation (*taklīf*) Is Not Valid Except through the Messengers (as)

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that reason (*‘aql*) is in need, in its knowledge and conclusions, of transmission (*sam‘*), and that it is not independent of a transmitted source which alerts the rational person to the manner of inference. They also hold that at the beginning of obligation and its initiation in the world, there must necessarily be a Messenger. The people of ḥadīth have agreed with them in this.

The Mu‘tazila, the Khārijites, and the Zaydiyyah have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claimed that intellects operate independently, without need of transmission or authoritative appointment (*tawqīf*). However, the Baghdādī faction of the Mu‘tazila, in particular, affirm the necessity of messengership at the beginning of obligation, yet they differ from the Imāmiyyah regarding the underlying cause for this. They establish causes which the Imāmiyyah affirm as valid, while also adding them to their own causal reasoning in the manner we have described.

8— Discourse on the Distinction between Messengers and Prophets (as)

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that every Messenger (*rasūl*) is a Prophet (*nabī*), but not every Prophet is a Messenger. Among the Prophets of Allah (swt) there were those who were preservers of the laws of the Messengers and their successors in rank. The Sharī‘ah only prevented the designation of our Imāms as prophets, not because reason would prohibit that, but despite their possessing the very meaning which those Prophets we have mentioned (as) possessed.

They are also agreed upon the permissibility of the sending of a Messenger who renews the Sharī‘ah of one who preceded him, even if he does not inaugurate a new law, and who confirms the prophethood of those before him, even if he does not impose, beyond that, any additional obligation.

The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of these two positions. Along with the Imāmiyyah in affirming their soundness are a group of the Murji‘ah and all of the people of ḥadīth.

9— Discourse Concerning the Forefathers of the Messenger of Allah (saww), His Mother, and His Uncle Abū Ṭālib — may the mercy of Allah (swt) be upon them

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the forefathers of the Messenger of Allah (saww), from Ādam up to ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib, were believers in Allah (swt) and affirmers of His oneness. They have adduced proof for this from the Qur’ān and the transmitted reports. Allah (swt) has said: *“Who sees you when you stand, and your turning among those who prostrate”* (Qur’ān 26:218–219). And the Messenger of Allah (saww) said: *“I was continually transferred from the loins of the pure ones to the wombs of the purified women, until He brought me forth into this world of yours.”*

They are also agreed that his uncle Abū Ṭālib (rz) died as a believer, that Āminah bt. Wahb was upon tawḥīd, and that she will be resurrected among the believers. All the sects whom we have named earlier have opposed them regarding this doctrine.

10 — Discourse on al-Raj‘ah, al-Badā’, and the Compilation of the Qur’ān

The Imāmiyyah are agreed upon the obligation of the return (*raj‘ah*) of many of the dead to the world before the Day of Resurrection, even though there is disagreement among them regarding the manner and meaning of the *raj‘ah*. They are also agreed upon the permissibility of applying the term *al-badā’* to Allah (swt) and that this is established by way of transmitted evidence (*sam‘*), not by analogical reasoning (*qiyās*). They are further agreed that the Imāms of misguidance opposed [the rightful order] in many aspects of the compilation of the Qur’ān, deviating therein from the requirement of the revelation (*tanzīl*) and the Sunnah of the Prophet (saww).

The Mu‘tazila, the Khārijites, the Zaydiyyah, the Murji‘ah, and the people of ḥadīth have unanimously agreed upon opposition to the Imāmiyyah in all that we have enumerated.

11 — Discourse on the Threat (*al-wa‘īd*)

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the threat of eternal abiding in the Fire is directed exclusively toward the unbelievers, not toward those who commit sins from among the people who possess knowledge of Allah (swt) and who affirm His obligatory duties, from among the people of prayer. All of the Murji‘ah concurred with them in this doctrine, except Muḥammad b. Shabīb, and all of the people of ḥadīth without exception. The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, claiming that the threat of eternal abiding in the Fire is general, encompassing both the unbelievers and all sinful persons from among the people of prayer.

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that whoever is punished for his sin from among the people of affirmation, knowledge, and prayer will not abide eternally in punishment, but will be brought forth from the Fire into Paradise, where he will enjoy everlasting bliss. Those whom we have already enumerated are in agreement with them regarding this. The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this, claiming that no one who enters the Fire for punishment will ever be brought out of it.

12 — Discourse on Intercession (*al-shafā‘ah*)

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Messenger of Allah (saww) will intercede on the Day of Resurrection for groups among the perpetrators of major sins from his community; that Amīr al-Mu‘minīn (as) will intercede for those among his Shī‘a who are possessors of sins; and that the Imāms of the Family of Muḥammad (as) likewise intercede. By their intercession,

Allah saves many of the erring. The Murji'ah except Ibn Shabīb and a group among the people of ḥadīth agree with them regarding the intercession of the Messenger (saww).

The Mu'tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claim that the intercession of the Messenger of Allah (saww) is for the obedient only, not for the disobedient, and that he does not intercede for any of creation who deserves punishment.

13 — Discourse on Names and Rulings

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that one who commits major sins from among the people of knowledge and affirmation does not thereby exit Islām, and that he remains a Muslim, even if he is sinful (*fāsiq*) by virtue of what he has committed of major sins and transgressions. All of the Murji'ah agree with them in this doctrine, as do all of the people of ḥadīth without exception, and a group among the Zaydiyyah.

The Mu'tazila, many of the Khārijites, and the Zaydiyyah have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claimed that one who commits major sins from among those we have mentioned is sinful but neither a believer nor a Muslim, even if he combines with his sinfulness all that is enumerated of acts of obedience whose abandonment would otherwise constitute sin.

14 — Discourse on Islām and Īmān

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that Islām is other than Īmān; that every believer (*mu'min*) is a Muslim, but not every Muslim is a believer; and that the distinction between these two meanings in religion is as it was in the language. The Murji'ah and the people of ḥadīth concur with them in this doctrine.

The Mu‘tazila, many of the Khārijites, and the Zaydiyyah have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claimed that every Muslim is a believer, and that there is no distinction between Islām and Īmān in religion.

15 — Discourse on Repentance and Its Acceptance

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the acceptance of repentance is a gracious favor from Allah (swt) and is not something rationally obligatory such that it must necessarily annul what has previously been deserved of punishment.

Were it not that transmitted evidence (*sam‘*) has come indicating its annulment, reason would allow the possibility of punishment being carried out upon those who repent, on the condition of prior entitlement. The people of ḥadīth agree with them in this doctrine.

The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claim that repentance necessarily annuls what has previously been deserved of punishment by way of obligation.

16 — Discourse on the People of Innovation (*ahl al-bida‘*) and What They Deserve Thereby in Terms of Names and Rulings

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that all people of innovation are unbelievers, and that it is incumbent upon the Imām, when empowered, to call them to repentance after summoning them and establishing the proofs against them. If they repent from their innovations and return to what is correct, [they are spared]; otherwise, he is to put them to death for their apostasy from faith. Whoever among them dies upon that innovation is among the people of the Fire.

The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. They claim that many of the people of innovation are sinful but not unbelievers, and that among them are those who are not deemed sinful by their innovation and do not thereby exit Islām such as the Murji’ah from among the followers of Ibn Shabīb, and the Batriyyah from among the Zaydiyyah who agree with them in foundational principles, even if they oppose them regarding the attributes of the Imām.

17 — Discourse on the Preferability between the Prophets and the Angels (as)

The Imāmiyyah are agreed that the Prophets of Allah (swt) and His Messengers from among mankind are superior to the angels. The people of ḥadīth agree with them in this doctrine.

The Mu‘tazila have unanimously agreed upon the opposite of this. The majority among them claimed that the angels are superior to the Prophets and the Messengers, while a group among them — apart from those we have mentioned — adopted suspension (*waqf*) regarding the preferability of one of the two groups over the other. Their disagreement in this chapter is as we have described, while their unanimity stands in opposition to decisively affirming the superiority of the Prophets over the angels, in accordance with what we have explained.

Chapter: Description of What I Have Selected from the Usool, by way of rational consideration and in accordance with what has been transmitted in the reports from the Imāms of guidance from the Family of Muḥammad (saww), and mention of those among the adherents of doctrinal positions whose doctrines agree with that

18 — Discourse on *al-Tawḥīd*

I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) is One in divinity and pre-eternity (*al-azaliyyah*). Nothing resembles Him, nor is it permissible that anything be comparable to Him. He is singular in being worshipped, having no second therein in any respect or by any means. Upon this there is consensus among the people of tawḥīd, except for a faction among the anthropomorphists (*ahl al-tashbīh*), for they employed His terms while differing regarding their meanings.

A man from among the people of Baṣrah, known as al-Ash‘arī, introduced a doctrine in which he opposed the wording of all the monotheists and their meanings in what we have described. He claimed that Allah (swt) possesses eternal attributes, and that He has eternally been characterized by meanings which are neither Him nor other than Him, by virtue of which He deserves to be described as knowing, living, powerful, hearing, seeing, speaking, and willing. He further claimed that Allah (swt) has an eternal face, eternal hearing, eternal sight, and two eternal hands, and that all of these are pre-eternal, eternal. This is a doctrine to which none of those who profess tawḥīd preceded him, let alone the people of Islām.

19 — Discourse on the Attributes

I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) is Living by His very Essence, not by [an acquired] life ; Powerful by His very Essence, and Knowing by His very Essence, not by a meaning (*ma‘nā*) as held by the anthropomorphists among the adherents of attributes, nor by differentiated states (*aḥwāl*) as innovated by Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā‘ī, by which he diverged from the rest of the people of tawḥīd and

committed something more repugnant than the doctrine of the adherents of attributes. This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah, the Mu‘tazila except for the one we have named, most of the Murji’ah, the majority of the Zaydiyyah, a group among the people of ḥadīth, and the Muḥakkimah.

And I say: Indeed, the Speech of Allah (swt) is originated (*muhḍath*), and by this the reports transmitted from the Family of Muḥammad (as) have come. Upon this is the consensus of the Imāmiyyah, the entirety of the Mu‘tazila, the Murji’ah except for those who deviated from it, a group among the people of ḥadīth, the majority of the Zaydiyyah, and the Khārijites.

And I say: Indeed, the Qur’ān is the Speech of Allah and His revelation, and that it is originated, as Allah (swt) has described it. I refrain from applying the statement that it is “created” (*makhlūq*). Upon this have come the reports from the Truthful Ones (as). This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah except for those among them who deviated, and it is the doctrine of the majority of the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila, many of the Murji’ah, the Zaydiyyah, and the people of ḥadīth.

And I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) is described as willing (*murīd*) by way of transmitted evidence (*sam‘*), adherence, and submission, in accordance with what has come in the Qur’ān; I do not affirm that by way of rational necessity.

And I say: Indeed, the will of Allah (swt) with respect to His own acts is identical to His acts themselves, and His will with respect to the acts of His creation is His command to them to perform those acts. By this have come the reports from the Imāms of guidance from the Family of Muḥammad (as). This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah except for those who deviated from it slightly and departed from what the early authorities held. To it goes the majority of the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī in particular, and a group of the Murji’ah. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila oppose this view, and the anthropomorphists and the adherents of attributes agree with them in opposing it.

And I say: It is not permissible to name the Creator (swt) except by what He has named Himself in His Book, or upon the tongue of His Prophet (saww), or by what His proofs from among the successors of His Prophet have named Him. I say likewise regarding the attributes. Upon this the reports from the Family of Muḥammad (as) are in full agreement. This is the doctrine of a group among the Imāmiyyah, many of the Zaydiyyah, all of the Baghdādī

Mu‘tazila, the majority of the Murji’ah, and the people of ḥadīth except that these groups substitute consensus in place of the Imām, the Proof (*al-ḥujjah*), in this matter.

20 — Discourse on Describing the Creator (swt) as Hearing (*samī’*), Seeing (*baṣīr*), Seeing (*rā’*), and Perceiving (*mudrik*)

I say: Indeed, the entitlement of the Pre-Eternal One (swt) to all of these attributes is established by way of transmitted evidence (*samī’*), not by analogy or by the proofs of reason. The meaning in all of them is knowledge alone, without anything additional in meaning; for whatever is additional to that, in our understanding and in the sense of our language, is sensory perception, and that is impossible for the Pre-Eternal One.

It may also be said, regarding the meaning of *mudrik* when Allah (swt) is described by it, that nothing escapes Him and nothing eludes Him. It is not permissible that it be intended thereby the meaning of sensory perception of sight or of our other senses, for that is, in reality, sensation, as we have explained.

I am not aware of any disagreement among the theologians of the Imāmiyyah in this chapter. It is the doctrine of the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila, a group among the Murji’ah, and a number among the Zaydiyyah. The anthropomorphists, their counterparts among the adherents of attributes, and the Baṣran school of the Mu‘tazila oppose this view.

21 — Discourse on Allah’s Knowledge of Things before Their Existence

I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) is knowing of everything that will be before it comes to be, and there is no originated thing except that He knew it prior to its

origination. There is no known thing, nor anything possible to be known, except that He is knowing of its reality (swt): nothing is hidden from Him on earth nor in the heaven. This is what the proofs of reason, the inscribed Book, and the recurrent reports from the Family of the Messenger (saww) have established. This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah.

We do not recognize what the Mu‘tazila have reported concerning Hishām b. al-Ḥakam as opposing this view. In our assessment, it is a fabrication against him and an error on the part of those who imitated them in this matter and transmitted it from among the Shī‘a on his authority. We have not found for him a compiled book nor a firmly established session in which such a view was stated, and his discourse in the principles of the Imāmah and the matters of examination indicates the opposite of what the opponents have attributed to him.

In what we have adopted in this chapter, all those who ascribe themselves to tawḥīd agree with us, except Jahm b. Ṣafwān from among the determinists (*al-mujabbirah*) and Hishām b. ‘Amr al-Fūṭī from among the Mu‘tazila. They claimed that knowledge does not attach to the non-existent and only applies to what exists, and that if Allah (swt) were to know things before their existence, examination (*imtiḥān*) would not be proper.

22 — Discourse on the Attributes

I say: Indeed, an attribute (*ṣifah*), in reality, is that which informs of an acquired meaning that is particular to the described subject and to that in which others may share with it. It does not truly assume this character until it is a spoken expression or a written form that indicates what utterance indicates and serves on our behalf in conveying it. This is the doctrine of the people of tawḥīd. A group among the anthropomorphists (*ahl al-tashbīh*) have opposed it.

23 — Discourse on That Which Abū Hāshim Alone Innovated Regarding the *Aḥwāl*

I say: Indeed, describing the Creator (swt) as living, powerful, and knowing conveys intelligible meanings which are neither the Essence itself nor things subsisting in it, as all the adherents of attributes maintain; nor are they differentiated states (*aḥwāl*) inhering in the Essence, as Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī held. In this, he opposed all the monotheists.

My statement regarding the intended meaning is that it refers to the intelligible meaning in discourse, not to existing concrete entities. This is the doctrine of all the monotheists. The anthropomorphists and Abū Hāshim oppose it, as we have mentioned.

24 — Discourse on Describing the Creator (swt) as Possessing Power over Justice and Its Contrary, and over That Which He Knows Will Occur and That Which He Knows Will Not Occur

I say: Indeed, Allah ̎ glorious is His majesty ̎ is capable of [acting] contrary to justice just as He is capable of justice; however, He does not commit injustice, wrongdoing, or any repugnant act. Upon this position are the Imāmiyyah as a body, all of the Mu'tazila except al-Nazzām, and a group among the Murji'ah, the Zaydiyyah, the people of ḥadīth, and the Muḥakkimah. The determinists (al-mujabbirah) in their entirety oppose us in this, as does al-Nazzām and those who agree with them in negating power with respect to justice and tawḥīd.

And I say: Indeed, He (swt) is capable of that which He knows will not occur, so long as it is not intrinsically impossible, such as the conjunction of opposites and the like of impossibilities. Upon this there is consensus among the people of tawḥīd, except al-Nazzām and a few deviants among the adherents of createdness.

25 — Discourse on Negating the Vision of Allah (swt) by the Eyes

And I say: Indeed, it is not valid that the Creator (swt) be seen by the eyes. To this reason bears witness, the Qur'ān speaks clearly, and recurrent reports from the Imāms of guidance from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) have been transmitted. Upon this position stand the majority of the Imāmiyyah and the general body of their theologians, except for those among them who deviated due to a doubt that arose for them in interpreting the reports.

The entirety of the Mu'tazila agree with the Imāmiyyah in this matter, as do the majority of the Murji'ah, many of the Khārijites and the Zaydiyyah, and groups among the people of ḥadīth. Those who oppose this view are the anthropomorphists (*al-mushabbihah*) and their counterparts among the adherents of attributes.

26 — Discourse on Justice (*al-'adl*) and Creation

I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) is just and generous. He created the creation for His worship, commanded them to obey Him, and forbade them from disobeying Him. He encompassed them with His guidance, initiated them with blessings, and bestowed favor upon them with beneficence. He did not burden anyone beyond capacity, nor did He command anyone except with that for which He granted him the ability. There is no futility in His act, no disparity in His creation, and no repugnance in His deed. (swt) above sharing with His servants in [creating] actions, and exalted above compelling them to acts. He does not punish anyone except for a sin he himself committed, nor does He reproach a servant except for a vile act he himself performed. He does not wrong by the weight of an atom; and if there be a good deed, He multiplies it and grants from Himself a great reward.

Upon this doctrine stands the majority of the Imāmiyyah, and upon it the reports from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) have been transmitted

recurrently. To it go the entirety of the Mu‘tazila except for ʿDirār and his followers. It is also the doctrine of many of the Murji’ah, a group among the Zaydiyyah, the Muḥakkimah, and a number among the people of ḥadīth.

The majority of the common people and the remainder of those we have enumerated oppose this. They claim that Allah (swt) created most of His creation for disobedience, singled out some of His servants for His worship, did not encompass them all with His blessing, burdened most of them with obedience beyond their capacity, created the acts of all His creatures, punished the disobedient for what He Himself enacted in them of disobedience, commanded what He did not will and forbade what He did will, decreed injustice upon servants, loved corruption, and disliked guidance for most of His servants. (swt) far above what the wrongdoers say, in transcendent exaltation.

27 — Discourse on the Disapproval of Applying the Term “Creator” (*khāliq*) to Any of the Servants

And I say: Indeed, the servants perform acts, originate, invent, manufacture, and acquire; however, I do not apply the statement to them that they “create,” nor do I say that they are “creators.” I do not go beyond mentioning that which Allah (swt) has mentioned, nor do I exceed the places in which it occurs in the Qur’ān. Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the Imāmiyyah, the Zaydiyyah, the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila, the majority of the Murji’ah, and the people of ḥadīth.

The Baṣran Mu‘tazila have opposed this view and applied to the servants the designation that they are “creators,” thereby departing from the consensus of the Muslims.

28 — Discourse on *al-Luṭf* and *al-Aṣḥāḥ*

I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) does not do with His servants, so long as they are morally responsible (*mukallaḥūn*), except that which is the most beneficial (*al-aṣḥāḥ*) for them in their religion and their worldly life. He does not withhold from them any rectification or benefit. Thus, whoever He enriches, He has acted toward him with what is most beneficial in governance; likewise, whoever He impoverishes, whoever He grants health, and whoever He afflicts with illness the ruling concerning all of these is the same.

And I say: That which the proponents of *al-luṭf* deemed obligatory of *luṭf* is only obligatory by way of generosity and munificence, not in the manner they supposed that justice necessitates it, and that were He not to do it, He would be unjust.

And I say: Whomever Allah (swt) knows that if He were to create him and obligate him [with duties], he would not believe, and that none of creation would benefit from his creation, his continued existence, his obligation, or any of his acts, nor would any beneficiary benefit thereby in religion it is not permissible that He create him. And whomever He knows that, if He were to keep him alive, he would repent from his disobedience, it is not permissible that He cause him to perish prematurely. Indeed, the justice of Allah (swt) His generosity and His munificence necessitate what I have described and decree it. It is not permissible that He act contrary to it, due to the impossibility of attributing futility, miserliness, or need to Him.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah, all of the Baghdādī Mu'tazila, many of the Murji'ah and the Zaydiyyah. The Baṣran Mu'tazila oppose it, and the determinists (*al-mujabbirah*) agree with them in opposing it.

29 — Discourse on the Commencement of Creation in Paradise

I say: Indeed, it was not permissible that creation begin in Paradise in a state of bliss without obligation, because were that the case, it would constitute a

deprivation for one whom Allah (swt) knows that if He were to obligate him, he would obey and thus attain the bliss deserved by deeds bliss which is higher, more exalted, and more sublime than gratuitous bestowal of bliss. Allah (swt) is more generous than to deprive anyone of a good benefit, or to confine him to a favor when another is better for him and more beneficial in governance. For such conduct only occurs from one who is ignorant, who deems that good, or from one who is in need of withholding, or from one who is miserly. Allah (swt) is far above such attributes in transcendent exaltation.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah. Reports from the Imāms (as) have come in support of it. The Baghdādī Mu‘tazila agree with them in this matter, while the Baṣran Mu‘tazila oppose the group regarding it. The determinists (*al-mujabbirah*) and the anthropomorphists (*al-mushabbihah*) agree with them in this opposition.

30 — Discourse on Knowledge (*al-ma‘rifah*)

I say: Indeed, knowledge of Allah (swt) is acquired (*iktisāb*), and likewise knowledge of His Prophets (as), and of every unseen matter. It is not permissible that one be compelled by necessity to the knowledge of any of what we have mentioned. This is the doctrine of many of the Imāmiyyah and, in particular, the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila, the determinists (*al-mujabbirah*), and the Ḥashwiyyah among the people of ḥadīth oppose this view.

31 — Discourse on the Fact that Allah Does Not Punish Except for a Sin or for Committing a Reprehensible Act

And I say: Indeed, Allah — glorious is His majesty — is just and generous. He does not punish anyone except for a sin he has acquired, a crime he has

committed, or a reprehensible act from which He forbade him and which he nevertheless committed. This is the doctrine of all the people of tawḥīd, except Jahm b. Ṣafwān and ‘Abd al-Salām b. Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā’ī.

As for Jahm b. Ṣafwān, he used to claim that Allah punishes one whom He compels into disobedience, while not granting him any power over it nor over refraining from it in obedience. As for ‘Abd al-Salām al-Jubbā’ī, he used to claim that a servant may be devoid of both the performance of good and the commission of evil together, and may exit both action and omission entirely, and that Allah (swt) punishes him for not performing an obligation, even though by exiting both he has neither done anything nor had anything done to him. This is a doctrine to which none among the people of tawḥīd preceded him; it is as reprehensible as the doctrine of Jahm, and in some respects even more reprehensible than it.

32 — Discourse on the Infallibility (*‘iṣmah*) of the Prophets (as)

I say: Indeed, all the Prophets of Allah (as) are infallible from major sins (*al-kabā’ir*) both before prophethood and after it, and from all minor sins whose perpetrator would be deemed contemptible. As for a minor sin whose perpetrator would not be deemed contemptible, its occurrence from them before prophethood is permissible, without deliberate intent; however, its occurrence from them after prophethood is absolutely impossible in all cases. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah. The entirety of the Mu‘tazila oppose this view.

33 — Discourse on the Infallibility (*‘iṣmah*) of Our Prophet Muḥammad (saww)

I say: Indeed, our Prophet Muḥammad (saww) never disobeyed Allah (swt) from the moment Allah (swt) created him until He took his soul. He never deliberately opposed Him, nor did he commit any sin, neither intentionally nor through forgetfulness. The Qur'ān has spoken to this effect, and the reports from the Family of Muḥammad (as) have been transmitted recurrently. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah, while the entirety of the Mu'tazila hold the opposite view.

As for that upon which the people of opposition rely, such as the saying of Allah, (swt): *“That Allah may forgive you what has preceded of your sin and what will follow”* (Qur'ān 48:2), and similar passages in the Qur'ān, which they depend upon as proof in support of what contradicts what we have mentioned it is an interpretation contrary to what they imagine, and proof supports it with clarification. Indeed, the Criterion (*al-Furqān*) has spoken with what we have described, for He (swt) said: *“By the star when it descends: your companion has neither gone astray nor erred”* (Qur'ān 53:1–2), thereby negating from him every act of disobedience and forgetfulness.

34 — Discourse on the Aspect of the Inimitability (*i'jāz*) of the Qur'ān

I say: Indeed, the aspect of that [inimitability] lies in *ṣarf* that Allah (swt) diverted the people of eloquence and command of language from producing opposition to the Prophet (saww) with the like of it in composition and arrangement, at the time he challenged them. He made their being diverted from bringing forth its like despite its being within their capacity a proof of his prophethood (saww). This divine favor (*lutf*) from Allah (swt) continues in the act of diversion from it until the end of time. This is among the clearest proofs of inimitability and the most remarkable of expositions. It is the doctrine of al-Nazzām, and the majority of the people of i'tizāl oppose it.

35 — Discourse on Prophethood: Is It a Bestowal (*tafaḍḍul*) or an Entitlement?

And I say: Indeed, the conferral of prophethood is a gracious bestowal from Allah (swt) upon one whom He singles out with His nobility, due to His knowledge of the praiseworthy outcome of that person and the convergence of the qualities which, in wisdom, necessitate his prophethood, thereby giving him precedence over others. As for the veneration attendant upon undertaking the office of prophethood, the honoring, and the obligation of obedience, that is deserved by virtue of the knowledge which we have mentioned.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah, and of all our jurists and transmitters among them. Those who opposed it are the proponents of transmigration (*tanāsukh*) who ascribe themselves to the Imāmiyyah and others besides them. Agreeing with them in that are the theologians among the Imāmiyyah from the family of Banū Nawbakht and all who followed them among those affiliated with kalām, as well as the majority of the Mu‘tazila regarding the view of bestowal therein, and all of the people of ḥadīth upon a similar position.

36 — Discourse on the Imāmah: Is It a Bestowal from Allah (swt) or an Entitlement?

And I say: Indeed, the assignment of the Imāmah, in its meaning, is a gracious bestowal upon the Imām, just as prophethood is, in accordance with what I have previously set forth. As for the obligatory veneration of him, the reverence, and the obedience [due to him], these are deserved by virtue of his resolve to carry out what he has been charged with of duties, and by the deeds that actually proceed from him, moment by moment. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah, as I have stated regarding prophethood.

Those among them whom I mentioned earlier have opposed this view. In this matter, the majority of the Mu‘tazila and all of the people of ḥadīth agree with me.

37 — Discourse on the Infallibility (*‘iṣmah*) of the Imāms (as)

And I say: Indeed, the Imāms who stand in the place of the Prophets (saww) in executing rulings, establishing prescribed punishments, preserving the religious laws, and disciplining mankind are infallible with an infallibility like that of the Prophets. It is not permissible for them to commit any minor sin except that whose permissibility I have previously mentioned with respect to the Prophets; nor is it permissible for them to commit any lapse (*sahw*) in anything pertaining to religion, nor do they forget any of the legal rulings.

Upon this is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah, except for those among them who deviated and clung to the apparent sense of certain reports which admit interpretations contrary to their corrupt assumption in this chapter. The entirety of the Mu‘tazila oppose this view, and they permit the occurrence of major sins and even apostasy from Islām on the part of the Imāms.

38 — Discourse on the Deputies of the Imāms (as): Their Infallibility and Its Absence, and Whether Their Authority Is by Explicit Designation or by Choice

And I say: It is not obligatory that the deputies of the Imāms (as) be infallible, nor is it obligatory that they possess knowledge of all that they govern, nor that they be superior therein to those under their authority due to the impossibility of the leadership of one inferior over one superior in that with respect to which he is a leader. Nor is it obligatory, with regard to their authority, that there be explicit designation (*naṣṣ*) upon their individual persons. Rather, it is permissible that Allah entrust their selection to the infallible Imāms (as).

This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah. As for Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them they deem explicit designation upon the individual persons of the deputies of the Imāms to be obligatory, just as they deem it obligatory with respect to the Imāms themselves (as)...

39 — Discourse on the Judgments of the Imāms (as)

And I say: Indeed, the Imām may judge according to his knowledge just as he judges according to the apparent purport of testimonies. Whenever he knows regarding the one testified against something contrary to what the testimony contains, he invalidates thereby the testimony of those who testified against him and judges concerning him according to what Allah (swt) has made him know. It is also permissible, in my view, that the inner realities of matters may be hidden from him, such that he judges them according to outward appearances, even if they are contrary to the reality with Allah, (swt). It is likewise permissible that Allah (swt) indicate to him the distinction between truthful witnesses and lying ones, such that the true state of affairs is not hidden from him.

Matters in this chapter are connected to *al-alṭāf* and interests (*al-maṣāliḥ*) which are not known in every circumstance except by Allah (swt).

Among the people of the Imāmah there are three positions regarding this doctrine:

1. Among them are those who claim that the judgments of the Imāms (as) are based on outward appearances only, not on what they know inwardly in all cases.
2. Among them are those who claim that their judgments are based solely on inner realities, not on outward appearances in which disagreement may occur.
3. Among them are those who hold the position which I have chosen in this doctrine.

I have not found, regarding this issue, anything from Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them that would allow me to definitively ascribe a specific position to them with certainty and without doubt.

40 — Discourse on the Knowledge of the Imāms (as) of All Crafts and All Languages

And I say: Indeed, this is not impossible for them, nor is it obligatory by way of reason or analogy. Reports have come from those whose truthfulness is obligatory to affirm, stating that the Imāms of the Family of Muḥammad (saww) did indeed possess such knowledge. If this is established, then it becomes obligatory to affirm it decisively on the basis of those reports, with firm conviction. As for my own decisive affirmation of it on their basis, I maintain a degree of reservation; and Allah is the One who grants success to what is correct.

Upon this view of mine are a group among the Imāmiyyah. Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them have opposed this view and deemed it obligatory by reason and analogy. All of the *mufawwiḍah* and the rest of the extremists (*al-ghulāt*) agree with them in this position.

41 — Discourse on the Knowledge of the Imāms (as) of Inner Thoughts and Future Events, and on the Application of the Statement that They Possess Knowledge of the Unseen, and Whether That Is Attributed to Them as an Attribute

And I say: Indeed, the Imāms from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) did know the inner thoughts (*ḍamā'ir*) of some of the servants, and they knew what would occur before its occurrence. However, this is not obligatory as an attribute of theirs, nor is it a condition for their Imāmah. Rather, Allah (swt)

honored them with it and informed them thereof as a form of grace (*lutf*) to facilitate obedience to them and adherence to their Imāmah. It is not rationally obligatory, but it became established for them by way of transmitted evidence (*sam*).

As for applying the statement to them that they “know the unseen” (*‘ilm al-ghayb*), that is a repudiated claim manifest in its corruption, because such a description is only deserved by one who knows things by himself, not through acquired knowledge. This applies to none except Allah (swt). Upon this view of mine are the people of the Imāmah as a whole, except for those among them who deviated, namely the *mufawwiḍah* and those of the extremists (*al-ghulāt*) who affiliated themselves with them.

42 — Discourse on Revelation (al-waḥy) to the Imāms, the Manifestation of Divine Communication to Them, and Miracles

And I say: Indeed, reason does not preclude the descent of revelation to them, even though they are Imāms and not Prophets. For Allah (swt) revealed to the mother of Mūsā: “Nurse him; then when you fear for him, cast him into the river, and do not fear nor grieve; indeed, We shall return him to you and make him among the messengers” (Qur’ān 28:7). She thus came to know the validity of that by revelation and acted upon it, even though she was neither a Prophet, nor a Messenger, nor an Imām; rather, she was among the righteous servants of Allah.

The prevention of the descent of revelation upon the Imāms and of divine inspiration to them regarding matters is only due to the consensus upon the prohibition of that, and the agreement that whoever claims that anyone after our Prophet (saww) receives revelation has erred and committed unbelief. The knowledge of this is established as part of the religion of the Prophet (saww). Just as reason does not preclude the sending of a Prophet after our Prophet (saww) and the abrogation of his law, as he abrogated what preceded him of the laws of the Prophets, it is only consensus and certain knowledge that it

contradicts the religion of the Prophet (saww) approaching the level of necessity that prevents this.

The Imāmiyyah are entirely agreed upon what I have mentioned; there is among them, as I have described, no disagreement.

As for the manifestation of miracles upon them and divine indication [to them], it is among the possible matters which are neither rationally obligatory nor impossible by analogy. Reports have come concerning its occurrence from them (as) with such abundance and dissemination that it establishes it decisively by way of transmission and sound reports. With me in this chapter is the majority of the people of the Imāmah. Banū Nawbakht oppose this view and reject it. Many of those affiliated with the Imāmiyyah deem it rationally obligatory, just as they deem it obligatory for the Prophets.

The entirety of the Mu‘tazila oppose us all in this matter, except Ibn al-Ikhshīd and those who followed him, who hold it to be permissible. All of the people of ḥadīth deem it permissible for every righteous person among the people of piety and faith.

43 — Discourse on the Manifestation of Miracles upon Those Appointed from among the Elite, the Deputies, and the Gates

And I say: Indeed, this is permissible; neither reason, nor the Sunnah, nor the Book precludes it. This is the doctrine of a group among the senior scholars of the Imāmiyyah. To it also goes Ibn al-Ikhshīd from among the Mu‘tazila, and the people of ḥadīth with respect to the righteous and the pious.

Banū Nawbakht from among the Imāmiyyah prohibit this and agree with the Mu‘tazila in opposing us regarding it. The Zaydiyyah and the Khārijites who have deviated from Islām also join them in this position.

44 — Discourse on the Imāms (as) Hearing the Speech of the Noble Angels, Even Though They Do Not See Their Persons

And I say: The permissibility of this is established by way of reason, and it is not impossible with respect to the truthful ones among the Shī'a who are protected from misguidance. Clear proof and decisive evidence have come affirming its validity and its occurrence for the Imāms (as), as well as for those whom I have mentioned among their righteous, virtuous, and upright Shī'a. This is the doctrine of the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and their transmitters of reports.

Banū Nawbakht and a group among the people of the Imāmah have rejected this view those who possess no knowledge of the transmitted reports, who have not probed deeply into investigation, nor followed the path of correctness.

45 — Discourse on the Truthfulness of the Dreams of the Messengers, the Prophets, and the Imāms (as), and the Removal of Doubts from Them and from Dreams

And I say: Indeed, the dreams of the Messengers, the Prophets, and the Imāms (as) are truthful and do not lie, and that Allah (swt) has protected them from deceptive dreams (*aḥlām*). Reports have come to this effect from them (as) with clarity and wide transmission. Upon this doctrine are a group of the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and their transmitters of reports.

As for their theologians, I do not know of them any explicit negation or affirmation regarding this matter, nor any formal discussion or response concerning it. The entirety of the Mu'tazila oppose us in this matter.

46 — Discourse on the Preferability between the Imāms and the Prophets (as)

A group among the people of the Imāmah have decisively held that the Imāms (as) from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) are superior to all who preceded them from among the Messengers and the Prophets, with the exception of our Prophet Muḥammad (saww). Another group among them has held that they possess superiority over all the Prophets except the *Ūlū al-‘Azm* among them (as). A third group has rejected both of these positions and decisively held that all of the Prophets are superior to all of the Imāms (as).

This is a chapter in which reason has no scope to impose obligation or prohibition, nor is there consensus upon any one of the positions within it. Reports have come from the Prophet (saww) concerning Amīr al-Mu‘minīn (as) and his progeny from among the Imāms, and likewise reports from the truthful Imāms after him. In the Qur’ān there are passages that strengthen resolve toward what the first group has said in this matter.

47 — Discourse on the Obligation (*taklīf*) of the Angels

And I say: Indeed, the angels are subject to obligation, are promised reward, and are threatened with punishment. Allah (swt) has said: *“And whoever among them says: ‘Indeed, I am a god besides Him,’ We shall recompense him with Hell; thus do We recompense the wrongdoers”* (Qur’ān 21:29).

And I say: Indeed, they are infallible with respect to that which would entail punishment for them in the Fire. Upon this doctrine are the majority of the Imāmiyyah, all of the Mu‘tazila, most of the Murji‘ah, and a group among the people of ḥadīth.

A group among the Imāmiyyah have denied that the angels are subject to obligation, claiming that they are compelled toward actions. A group among the people of ḥadīth have agreed with them in this.

48 — Discourse on the Preferability between the Imāms (as) and the Angels

As for the messengers from among the angels and the Prophets (as), my position regarding them, in comparison with the Imāms of the Family of Muḥammad (saww), is the same as my position regarding the human Prophets and the Messengers (as). As for the remainder of the angels, then although they have attained excellence by virtue of their angelic nature, the Imāms from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) are superior to them and possess greater reward with Allah (swt) based on proofs whose proper place is not this book.

49 — Discourse on the Capacity of the Messengers, the Prophets, and the Imāms to Experience Pain, and on Their States after Death

And I say: Indeed, the Messengers of Allah (swt) from among mankind, His Prophets, and the Imāms from among His vicegerents are originated, fashioned beings. Pains befall them, pleasures occur to them, their bodies grow by nourishment, diminish with the passage of time, death befalls them, and annihilation is permissible with respect to them. Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the people of tawḥīd. Those who ascribe themselves to *tafwīd* and the various classes of the extremists (*al-ghulāt*) have opposed us in this matter.

As for their states after death: they are transferred from beneath the earth and dwell, with their bodies and their souls, in the Garden of Allah, (swt). They remain therein alive, enjoying bliss until the Day of death [i.e., the Resurrection]. They rejoice in those among the righteous of their communities and their Shī'a who join them, receive them with honors, and await those who will come to them like those who preceded them from among the possessors of faiths. Indeed, the Messenger of Allah (saww) and the Imāms from his progeny, in particular, are not unaware, after death, of the states of their Shī'a

in the abode of this world, by Allah's informing them of that, moment after moment. They hear the speech of those who supplicate to them at their honored and exalted shrines by a subtle grace from Allah (swt) between them and the majority of the servants. Supplications reach them from afar, as the reports have conveyed.

This is the doctrine of all the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and the bearers of reports among them. I do not know of any prior discourse concerning this among their theologians. I have heard of opposition regarding it from Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them and I have encountered a group of those deficient in knowledge, among those affiliated with the Imāmah as well, who reject it.

Allah (swt) has said in what indicates the general principle : *“Do not think that those who were killed in the way of Allah are dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, provided for; rejoicing in what Allah has given them of His bounty, and rejoicing in those who have not yet joined them from behind them, that there shall be no fear upon them, nor shall they grieve”* (Qur'ān 3:169–170), and what follows this of speech. And He said regarding the story of the believer of the family of Pharaoh: *“It was said: ‘Enter Paradise.’ He said: ‘Would that my people knew of how my Lord forgave me and made me among the honored’”* (Qur'ān 36:26–27).

And the Messenger of Allah (saww) said: *“Whoever sends salutations upon me at my grave, I hear it; and whoever sends salutations upon me from afar, it is conveyed to me peace of Allah be upon him, and the mercy of Allah and His blessings.”*

Then the reports detailing what we have mentioned in summary from the Imāms of the Family of Muḥammad (saww), in the manner we have described, explicitly and verbatim, are numerous. This book is not the place for mentioning them, otherwise I would have presented them in full detail and clarification.

50 — Discourse on the Dying Person Seeing the Messenger of Allah (saww) and Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) at the Time of Death

This is a chapter upon which the people of the Imāmah are agreed. Reports concerning it have been transmitted recurrently from the truthful ones among the Imāms (as). It has also been narrated from Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) that he said to al-Ḥārith al-Hamdānī may Allah have mercy upon him:

*O Ḥārith of Hamdān, whoever dies sees me—
whether a believer or a hypocrite—
before death.*

*He recognizes me by his gaze,
and I recognize him by his eye, his name,
and what he has done*

—in well-known verses.

Concerning this, Ismā'īl b. Muḥammad al-Sayyid (rz) said:

*And the dying one sees him when the soul is
between the uvula and the throat;
and whenever he wills, he emerges to the people,
striking their faces with wounds.*

However, I say regarding this: the meaning of the dying person's seeing of them peace be upon them both is the knowledge of the consequence of their *wilāyah*, or of doubt regarding them, or enmity toward them, or neglect of their rights, with certainty, by means of signs he finds within himself, indications, witnessing of states, and direct apprehension of realities, such that no doubt remains with him concerning what we have mentioned. This is not the seeing of the eyes of their persons, nor the witnessing of their bodies by the gaze through the connection of rays.

Allah (swt) has said: “*So whoever does an atom's weight of good shall see it, and whoever does an atom's weight of evil shall see it*” (Qur'ān 99:7–8). What He (swt) intended by “seeing” here is the knowledge of the consequence of deeds with certainty untainted by doubt. He (swt) also said: “*Whoever hopes for the meeting with his Lord then indeed the appointed time of Allah is coming*” (Qur'ān 29:5). The meeting with Allah (swt) is the meeting with the recompense for deeds.

Upon this position stand the precise investigators among the Imāmiyyah. A group among their *hashwiyyah*, however, have opposed them, claiming that the dying person sees his Prophet and his Walī with his physical sight just as visible objects are seen, and that the two of them attend his place and are physically present beside him in that location.

51 — Discourse on the Dying Person Seeing the Angels

My position regarding this is the same as my position regarding his seeing the Messenger of Allah and Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as). It is permissible that he see them with his physical sight, insofar as Allah (swt) increases the range of his vision such that he is able to perceive their subtle, translucent bodies. Such a thing is not permissible with respect to the Messenger of Allah (saww) and Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), due to the difference between their bodies and the bodies of the angels in their composition.

This is the doctrine of a group among the theologians of the Imāmiyyah, and among the Mu'tazila, Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and a group of the Baghdādīs.

52 — Discourse on the States of the Morally Responsible among the Subjects of the Imāms (as) after Death

I say: They are of four categories:

A category whom Allah revives and causes to dwell with their patrons (*awliyā'*) in the Gardens; a category who are revived and join their Imāms in a place of humiliation; a category concerning whom I suspend judgment permitting their being alive and permitting their remaining in the state of the dead;

and a category who are not revived after death until the resurrection and the final return.

As for the blissful category, they are those who attained clear insight in the doctrines and were thoroughly refined in acts of obedience. As for the punished category, they are those who were obstinate toward the truth and excessive in committing evil deeds. As for those whose life and remaining among the dead is doubtful, they are the sinful from among the people of knowledge and prayer—those who committed sins while acknowledging their prohibition, out of desire rather than obstinacy or deeming them lawful, and who procrastinated repentance from them, then were taken by death before doing so. For these, it is permissible for Allah (swt) to remove death from them, so that He may punish them in the *barzakh* for what they have acquired of crimes and thereby purify them from them before the Gathering, so that they return on the Day of Resurrection in safety from the Fire of Hell and enter the Gardens by virtue of their obedience. It is also permissible that their revival be deferred until the Day of Reckoning, for punishment there or for pardon, as Allah (swt) wills. Their affair in these two divisions is concealed from the servants.

As for the fourth category, they are those deficient with respect to the ultimate level in doctrinal knowledge without obstinacy, and the *mustad'afūn* among the rest of the people.

This doctrine, according to the explanation I have established, is the position of the transmitters of reports among the Imāmiyyah. Its basis is transmitted evidence (*samʿ*) and sound reports. I am not aware of any established doctrine regarding it among their theologians.

53 — Discourse on the Descent of the Two Angels upon the Inhabitants of the Graves and Their Questioning Them Concerning Belief

And I say: Indeed, this is true, and upon it there is consensus among the Shīʿa and the people of ḥadīth. The explanation of its general purport is that Allah (swt) sends down upon one whom He intends to bestow bliss upon after death two angels whose names are *Mubashshir* and *Bashīr*. They ask him about his Lord (swt) and about his Prophet and his Walī. He answers them with the truth

with which he departed the world, holding to correct belief. The purpose of their questioning him is to elicit the sign by which he deserves bliss, and they find it in him through his response.

And Allah (jjh) sends down upon one whom He intends to punish in the *barzakh* two angels whose names are *Nākar* and *Nakīr*, and He assigns them to punish him. The purpose of their questioning him is to elicit the sign of his deserving punishment, by what becomes manifest in his response such as hesitation away from the truth, reporting corrupt belief, or his bewilderment and inability to answer.

The two angels do not descend upon any of the inhabitants of the graves except those we have mentioned, nor is their questioning directed toward any of them except the living after death, in the manner we have described. This is the doctrine of the bearers of reports among the Imāmiyyah. They possess reports concerning what I have recorded here. I am not aware of any established discourse regarding this among their theologians that I could narrate in an ordered manner.

54 — Discourse on the Bliss of the Inhabitants of the Graves and Their Punishment: Upon What Basis Reward and Punishment Occur for Them, In What Manner They Reach Them, and What the Forms of Their Bodies Are in Those States

And I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) fashions for them bodies like their bodies in the abode of this world. He bestows bliss upon the believers among them therein, and He punishes the unbelievers among them therein, as well as the sinful among them therein apart from the bodies that lie in the graves, which are seen by observers to disperse, decay, and disintegrate with the passage of time. That [reward and punishment] reaches them in places other than the locations of their graves.

This proceeds in accordance with my doctrine concerning the soul (*al-nafs*). The meaning of the morally responsible human being, according to me, is a originated entity subsisting by itself, distinct from the attributes of substances

and accidents. I have, in support of this, reports from the truthful ones among the Family of Muḥammad (saww). I am not aware of any theologian among the Imāmiyyah prior to me who held a doctrine in this matter that I could relate, nor do I know of any disagreement between myself and the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and the people of ḥadīth regarding it.

55 — Discourse on the *Rajʿah* (Return)

And I say: Indeed, Allah (swt) will return a group of the dead to this world in the forms in which they previously were. Through this, He will grant honor to one group and abase another, and He will give ascendancy to those who are upon the truth over the false, and to the wronged among them over the wrongdoers. This will occur at the rise of the Mahdī of the Family of Muḥammad (as).

And I say: Those who return to the world are of two groups. One of them consists of those whose rank in faith was elevated, whose righteous deeds were many, and who departed this world while avoiding the destructive major sins. Allah (swt) will show them the state of truth, honor them by it, and grant them of this world what they had long desired. The other group consists of those who reached the utmost extreme in corruption, went to the furthest limits in opposing the people of truth, multiplied in wrongdoing against the friends of Allah, and committed transgressions. Allah (swt) will exact retribution for those against whom injustice was committed before death, and will assuage their anger against them by subjecting them to punishments.

Thereafter, both groups will return again to death, and after that to the Resurrection, and to that which they deserve of the everlasting continuance of reward and punishment. The Qurʾān has come affirming the soundness of this, the reports concerning it have been transmitted recurrently, and the Imāmiyyah in their entirety uphold it except for a few among them who interpreted what has been transmitted regarding it in a manner contrary to what we have described.

56 — Discourse on the Reckoning, Those Who Administer It, the Şirāt, and the Balance

And I say: The reckoning (*al-ḥisāb*) is the confronting of the servant with what he was commanded to do in the abode of this world. It pertains specifically to those among the people of faith who committed acts of disobedience. As for the unbelievers, their reckoning is their recompense according to what they deserve. The righteous believers are given their rewards in full without reckoning.

And I say: Those entrusted with administering the reckoning are the Messenger of Allah (saww), Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as), and the Imāms from their progeny — peace be upon them — by the command of Allah, (swt). He has assigned it to them as an honor for them, an exaltation of their stations, and a distinction over the rest of the servants. Thus have come the abundant reports from the truthful ones (as) from Allah, (swt). Allah (swt) has said: *“And say: ‘Act; for Allah will see your deeds, and His Messenger, and the believers’”* (Qur'ān 9:105), meaning the Imāms (as), according to the interpretation whose soundness admits of no doubt or uncertainty.

And I say: The Şirāt is a bridge between Paradise and the Fire. The feet of the believers remain firm upon it, while the feet of the unbelievers slip from it into the Fire. Thus too have come the reports. As for the Balance (*al-mīzān*), it is the weighing and adjustment between deeds and what is deserved in consequence of them. Those who effect the weighing in judgment at that time are the administrators of the reckoning from among the Imāms of the Family of Muḥammad (saww). Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the transmitters of ḥadīth from the people of the Imāmah. As for their theologians, I have not heard any discourse from them previously concerning any of these matters.

57 — Discourse on Intercession (*al-shafā'ah*)

And I say: Indeed, the Messenger of Allah (saww) will intercede on the Day of Resurrection for the sinners from among his community, specifically from among the Shī'a. Allah (swt) will accept his intercession. Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) will intercede for the disobedient among his Shī'a, and Allah (swt) will accept his intercession. The Imāms (as) will intercede in the like of what we have mentioned for their Shī'a, and Allah will accept their intercession. The righteous believer will intercede for his sinful believing friend, his intercession will benefit him, and Allah will accept his intercession.

Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the Imāmiyyah, except for those among them who deviated. The Qur'ān has spoken of it, and the reports concerning it have been transmitted recurrently. Allah (swt) said regarding the unbelievers, when informing of their regrets over what they missed while the people of faith attained it: *"So we have no intercessors, nor a devoted friend"* (Qur'ān 26:100–101).

And the Messenger of Allah (saww) said: *"Indeed, I shall intercede on the Day of Resurrection, and my intercession will be accepted; then 'Alī (as) will intercede and his intercession will be accepted; and indeed the least of the believers in intercession will intercede for forty of his brothers."*

58 — Discourse on *al-Badā'* and the Divine Will (*al-mashī'ah*)

And I say: With respect to the meaning of *al-badā'*, it is that which all Muslims, without exception, affirm regarding abrogation (*naskh*) and the like thereof such as impoverishment after enrichment, causing illness after well-being, causing death after life, and that which the people of justice (*ahl al-'adl*) in particular maintain regarding increase in lifespans and provisions and their decrease by virtue of deeds.

As for the application of the term *al-badā'* itself, I only adopted it on the basis of transmitted evidence (*sam'*) that has come from the intermediaries between the servants and Allah (swt). Had there not come transmitted evidence whose

soundness I know establishing it, I would not have permitted its application just as, were it not that transmitted evidence had come indicating that Allah (swt) becomes angry, is pleased, loves, and is amazed, I would not have applied such terms to Him (swt). But since transmitted evidence has come regarding it, I adopted it upon meanings that reason does not reject.

There is no disagreement between myself and all Muslims in this chapter. Rather, those who oppose them differ only regarding the wording, not regarding anything beyond it. I have clarified my reasoning for applying this term in a manner after which further discourse falls short. This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah. Everyone who departs from them in doctrine rejects it in the manner I have described rejecting the name while not rejecting the meaning, and not approving of it.

59 — Discourse on the Compilation of the Qur'ān, and What Some Have Mentioned Regarding Addition to It and Omission from It

I say: Reports have come abundantly from the Imāms of guidance from the Family of Muḥammad (saww) concerning differences in the Qur'ān and what some of the wrongdoers introduced into it by way of omission and deletion. As for the matter of its compilation, the existing [codex] indicates the advancement of what was later and the delaying of what was earlier; and one who knows the abrogating and the abrogated (*al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh*), and the Meccan and the Medinan, will not doubt what we have mentioned.

As for omission (*al-nuqṣān*), reason does not deem it impossible nor prevent its occurrence. I have examined the claim of those who assert it and debated it at length with the Mu'tazila and others, yet I did not obtain from them any proof upon which reliance could be placed to invalidate it. A group among the people of the Imāmah have said that not a word, nor a verse, nor a sūrah has been omitted; rather, what was omitted was that which had been recorded in the codex of Amīr al-Mu'minīn (as) of its interpretation and the explanation of its meanings according to the reality of its revelation. That was something established and revealed, even if it was not from among the Speech of Allah (swt) which is the inimitable Qur'ān. The interpretation of the Qur'ān may

itself be called “Qur’ān,” as Allah (swt) has said: “*Do not hasten with the Qur’ān before its revelation is completed to you, and say: ‘My Lord, increase me in knowledge’*” (Qur’ān 20:114). Thus He named the interpretation of the Qur’ān “Qur’ān.” Concerning this there is no disagreement among the people of tafsīr.

In my view, this position is closer [to correctness] than the view of one who claims omission of words from the Qur’ān itself in reality, apart from interpretation. Toward this I incline, and I ask Allah to grant success to what is correct.

As for addition (*al-ziyādah*) to it, its invalidity is decisively affirmed from one aspect, while its validity may be conceived from another aspect. The aspect whose invalidity I decisively affirm is that anyone among creation could add to it an amount equivalent to a sūrah in such a way that it would become ambiguous to any of the eloquent. As for the conceivable aspect, it is that a word, two words, a letter, or two letters, and the like thereof things that do not reach the level of inimitability could be added, and that this might be ambiguous to many of the eloquent as to whether it is from the words of the Qur’ān. However, were such a thing to occur, it would necessarily be that Allah would indicate it and clarify the truth of it to His servants.

I do not decisively affirm the occurrence of this; rather, I incline toward its non-occurrence and toward the Qur’ān’s being free of it. I have, in support of this, a report from al-Şādiq Ja‘far b. Muḥammad (as). This doctrine is contrary to what we have heard from Banū Nawbakht — may Allah have mercy upon them — regarding both addition to the Qur’ān and omission from it. A group among the theologians of the Imāmiyyah, as well as jurists and scholars of rational consideration among them, have adopted this view.

And I say: Concerning the threat (*al-wa'īd*), there is that which has already been related from the group of the Imāmiyyah. After that, I say: whoever performs an act for Allah and draws near to Allah by an act of devotion, Allah will reward him for that with everlasting bliss in the Gardens of eternal abiding.

Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them hold that many of those who obey Allah (swt) are rewarded for their obedience in this worldly abode, and that they have no share in the Hereafter. With me, in what I have adopted, are most of the Murji'ah and a group among the Imāmiyyah.

61 — Discourse on the Mutual Nullification (*taḥābuṭ*) of Deeds

And I say: Indeed, there is no mutual nullification between acts of disobedience and acts of obedience, nor between reward and punishment. This is the doctrine of a group among the Imāmiyyah and the Murji'ah. Banū Nawbakht, however, hold the view of mutual nullification in what we have mentioned, and in that they agree with the people of i'tizāl (the Mu'tazila).

62 — Discourse on the Unbelievers: Whether There Are among Them Those Who Know Allah (swt) and Whether Acts of Obedience Occur from Them

And I say: One who truly knows Allah (swt) does not disbelieve in Him, nor does one who is ungrateful for His blessings obey Him. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah and most of the Murji'ah.

Banū Nawbakht may Allah (swt) have mercy upon them oppose this view in this chapter. They claim that many of those who disbelieve in Allah nevertheless possess knowledge of Him, that they are obedient to Allah (swt) in many actions, and that for this they are recompensed and rewarded in this

world. With them, regarding part of this doctrine, are the Mu‘tazila, and regarding another part of it, a group among the Murji’ah.

63 — Discourse on *al-Muwāfah*

And I say: Indeed, whoever comes to know Allah (swt) at some point in his lifetime, and believes in Him at some moment of his time, will not die except upon belief in Him. And whoever dies upon unbelief in Allah (swt) then he never believed in Him at any time whatsoever.

With me in this doctrine are reports transmitted from the truthful ones (as). To it have gone many of the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and the transmitters of reports among them. It is also the doctrine of many of the theologians of *irjā’*. Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them oppose this view and adopt positions contrary to it, following the doctrines of the people of i‘tizāl (the Mu‘tazila).

64 — Discourse on Minor Sins (*ṣaghā’ir al-dhunūb*)

And I say: There is no sin that is “minor” in itself; rather, a sin is only considered minor in relation to another [greater] sin. This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of the Imāmah and of *irjā’*. Banū Nawbakht may Allah have mercy upon them oppose this view in this matter and adopt, in opposition to it, the doctrine of the people of threat (*ahl al-wa‘īd*) and i‘tizāl (the Mu‘tazila).

65 — Discourse on Generality and Specificity

And I say: For the most specific of specificity there is a form in language, but there is no form in language for the most specific of generality nor for its most general expression. Rather, what is intended thereby is known through what accompanies it of contextual indicators. This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of *irjā'*, and of all the theologians of the Imāmiyyah except for those who deviated from it and agreed with the people of *irjā'* among the adherents of i'tizāl (the Mu'tazila).

66 — Discourse on Names and Rulings

And I say: Those who commit major sins from among the people of knowledge and affirmation are believers by virtue of their faith in Allah, His Messenger, and what has come from Him, and are sinful (fussāq) by virtue of the major transgressions they carry. I do not apply to them the designation of sinfulness nor the designation of faith in an absolute sense; rather, I qualify both names when applying each of them to such persons. I refrain from applying either of the two to them without qualification, and I apply to them the name of Islām without qualification in every case. This is the doctrine of the Imāmiyyah, except for Banū Nawbakht, who opposed it in this matter and applied the designation of faith absolutely to the sinful.

67 — Discourse on Repentance (*al-tawbah*)

And I say: Concerning repentance, it is as I have previously related from the group of the Imāmiyyah. Beyond that, it is accepted from every sinner so long as he does not despair of life. Allah (swt) has said: "*But repentance is not for those who continue committing evil deeds until, when death comes to one of*

them, he says: 'Indeed, I repent now,' nor for those who die while they are unbelievers" (Qur'ān 4:18). And He (swt) has said: "Until, when death comes to one of them, he says: 'My Lord, send me back, that I may do righteous deeds in what I left behind.' No indeed! It is but a word he speaks, and behind them is a barrier (barzakh) until the day they are resurrected" (Qur'ān 23:99–100).

I do not know of any disagreement among all the people of knowledge in this chapter.

68 — Discourse on the Reality of Repentance

I say: Indeed, the reality of repentance is remorse over what has passed, in the manner of turning back to Allah (swt). Its condition is firm resolve to abandon returning to the like of that sin throughout one's entire life. Whoever does not combine in his repentance from his sin what we have mentioned is not a repentant, even if he abandons committing acts similar to what he previously committed of disobedience to Allah (swt).

This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of justice (*ahl al-ʿadl*). I do not know of any position among the theologians of the Imāmiyyah regarding it that I could narrate. ʿAbd al-Salām al-Jubbāʾī and those who followed him oppose this view.

69 — Discourse on Repentance from a Reprehensible Act While Persisting in One Like It in Reprehensibility

I say: Repentance from such an act is valid even if the repentant believes in the reprehensibility of that which he persists in, provided that the motivating factors differ between what is abandoned and what is resolved upon. However, if the motivating factors are the same in both cases, then repentance from it is not valid. This is the doctrine of all the people of tawḥīd, with the exception

of Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī, for he claimed that repentance is not valid from a reprehensible act while persisting in what one believes to be reprehensible, even if it is [in reality] good let alone if it is reprehensible.

70 — Discourse on Repentance from the Wrongs Committed against Servants

I say: Among the conditions of repentance to Allah (swt) from the wrongs committed against servants is that one must go forth to the wronged parties with their rights by restoring them to them, or by seeking their absolution from them with contented goodwill and voluntary consent. If the holder of the grievance is absent or cannot be found, one must go forth with the grievance to his heirs, or seek their absolution from it, in the manner we have mentioned. If the heirs are not found, one must firmly resolve to go forth to them whenever they are found, and exert one's utmost effort in doing so by seeking them during one's lifetime and by making a bequest concerning it after one's death.

If one is ignorant of the identities of those wronged or of their locations, one must firmly resolve and intend to discharge the grievance to them whenever they are identified, and strive exerting oneself to seek them out. If one fears missing that due to the arrival of death, one must make a bequest concerning it, as we have previously stated. If one lacks the means to restore the wrongs, one should ask people for assistance and support in what enables him to restore them, or hire himself out if that benefits him and constitutes a path to acquiring what will enable him to discharge the wrongs to their rightful owners.

The sum of this chapter is that it is obligatory upon wrongdoers, together with repentance, to exhaust their utmost efforts in discharging the wrongs owed to servants. If Allah knows that from them prior to their repentance, He will compensate the wronged on their behalf when the repentant are unable to restore their wrongs. If the repentant fall short in discharging the wrongs in what we have described, then their affair is with Allah (swt): if He wills, He punishes them; and if He wills, He bestows upon them pardon and forgiveness.

Upon this there is consensus among the people of prayer, among both the theologians and the jurists.

71 — Discourse on Repentance from the Killing of Believers

I say: Whoever kills a believer in a manner in which his blood is unlawful without deeming it lawful and then desires to repent from what he has done, it is incumbent upon him to surrender himself to the heirs of the slain. If they wish, they may exact retribution from him; if they wish, they may obligate him with blood money; and if they wish, they may pardon him. If he does not do so, his repentance is not accepted. If he does so, his repentance is accepted, and by it the punishment for what he committed is lifted from him. The Qur'ān has spoken to this effect, and consensus has been established upon it. Only a few among the *hashwiyyah* and the common folk have opposed this.

As for the case of one who deems the blood of believers lawful and kills a believer upon the basis of such deeming lawful: reason does not preclude his repentance or the acceptance of repentance from him. However, transmitted evidence (*al-sam'*) has come from the truthful ones among the Imāms of guidance (as) that whoever does that is never granted success in repentance, and does not repent in a manner that removes punishment from him doing so by choice, not by compulsion nor coercion. This is as reported from them (as): *“The child of fornication does not beget, nor does he choose faith in truth upon reaching maturity, even if he outwardly manifests it in every circumstance; rather, he only manifests it with doubt or hypocrisy, not with belief upon certainty”*.

Likewise, reports have come from Allah (swt) regarding groups among His creation that their ultimate end is toward the Fire, and that they will never believe in Him, nor abandon unbelief in Him and rebellion. Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the jurists of the Imāmiyyah and the transmitters of ḥadīth and reports among them. I have not found, among their theologians, any position concerning it that I could relate within the corpus of views.

72 — Chapter on Clarifying Knowledge of Unseen Matters and What Is Analogous to Them among Inferred Issues: Whether Such Knowledge Can Be Necessary (*iḍṭirārī*) or Is Entirely Acquired (*iktisābī*)

And I say: Indeed, knowledge of Allah (swt) of His Prophets (as), of the soundness of His religion which He has approved, and of every matter whose reality is not apprehended by the senses, and whose knowledge is not present at the outset (*badīhah*), but rather is attained through a form of inference (*qiyās*), cannot be from the category of necessary knowledge (*iḍṭirār*). Rather, it is not attained in all cases except through acquisition (*iktisāb*). Just as it is not correct that knowledge whose path is the senses should occur through inference, nor is it correct that knowledge which is immediate and primary (*badīhī*) should, in any state, be attained through inference.

This has already been mentioned previously, and we have added further explanation of it here for the sake of clarification. To this position go a group of the Baghdādī scholars. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila, the anthropomorphists (*al-mushabbihah*), and the adherents of determinism and *irjā’* oppose this view.

73 — Discourse on Knowledge of the Authenticity of Reports, and Whether There Can Be Necessity (*iḍṭirār*) in It, or Whether All of It Is Acquired (*iktisāb*)

And I say: Knowledge of the authenticity of all reports is attained by way of inference and reasoning, and it is obtained through acquisition. It is not valid that any part of it occur by necessity. The ruling concerning it is the same as the ruling concerning unseen matters in general. To this position go the majority of the Baghdādīs. The Baṣrans, the anthropomorphists (*al-mushabbihah*), and the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-ijbār*) oppose this view.

74 — Discourse on the Definition of *Tawātur* in Reports

And I say: *Tawātur* whose authenticity is decisively affirmed in reports is the transmission by a group whose collusion upon fabricating a report is customarily impossible, such that it would remain concealed and not become manifest upon scrutiny. This is a matter that returns to the conditions of people and the differences in their motives and circumstances. Knowledge of it returns to direct observation and concrete existence, and it cannot be adequately conceived for one absent from it merely through expression and discourse. This is the doctrine of the proponents of *tawātur* among the Baghdādīs. The Baṣrans oppose this view and define it by what yields necessary (*iḍtirārī*) knowledge.

75 — Discourse on That Which Is Perceived by the Senses, and Whether Knowledge Thereof Is an Act of Allah (swt) or an Act of the Servants

And I say: Knowledge by means of the senses is of three kinds:

One kind is from the act of Allah (swt); one kind is from the act of the perceiver (*al-ḥāss*); and one kind is from the act of other servants.

As for the act of Allah (swt) it is that knowledge which occurs to the knower by a cause from Allah, (swt) such as his knowledge of the sound of thunder, the color of lightning, the existence of heat and cold, the sounds of the winds, and the like of that which appears to the perceiver without his exerting effort to perceive it, and which occurs by a cause from Allah (swt) in which the servants have no choice.

As for the act of the perceiver, it is that which occurs to him immediately after opening his eyes, or listening with his ear, or exerting effort to perceive something by one of his senses, or by performing the cause that necessitates perception of the sensed object and the attainment of knowledge thereof.

As for the act of others among the servants, it is that which occurs to the perceiver by a cause from some of the servants such as one who shouts at another while he is not exerting effort to listen, or one who inflicts pain upon him so that he inevitably acquires knowledge of the pain upon its infliction, and the like of that.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the theologians of the Baghdādī school. Those whom we have mentioned oppose it.

76 — Discourse on the People of the Hereafter: Are They Commanded or Not Commanded?

And I say: Indeed, the people of the Hereafter are commanded by their intellects toward rectitude, and toward that guidance which was good for them in the abode of this world. Hearts do not turn away from what they are upon now, nor do they change from their true nature in any state. This is the doctrine of the theologians of the people of Baghdād. The Baṣrans and those whom we have mentioned oppose this view.

77—Discourse on the People of the Hereafter: Are They Legally Obligated (*mukallaḥūn*) or Not Obligated?

And I say: The people of the Hereafter are of two categories:

One category is in Paradise. They are commanded therein with that which they find agreeable, which is light upon their natures, and toward which they

incline such as gratitude to the Bestower (swt) glorifying Him, praising Him for His grace upon them and His beneficence toward them, and the like of such acts. Commanding them with what we have described, when the state is as mentioned, is not considered *taklīf*, because *taklīf* is only the imposition of that which is burdensome upon natures and entails hardship in its performance.

The second category is in the Fire. They are, by virtue of the punishment, its burdens, its hardships, and its pains, subject to innumerable forms of *taklīf* through actions. They are not divested of command and prohibition by their intellects, according to what we have explained. This is the doctrine of the group we have previously mentioned, and those sects whom we have named and mentioned oppose it.

78 — Discourse on the People of the Hereafter: Are They Free in Their Actions, or Compelled, or Coerced as the Opponents Claim?

And I say: Indeed, the people of the Hereafter are free in choice (*mukhtārūn*) with respect to the actions that proceed from them. They are neither compelled (*muḍṭarrūn*) nor coerced (*mulja'ūn*), even though unbelief and obstinate rejection do not occur from them.

And I say: That which removes the supposition of the occurrence of corruption from them is the absence of motives leading to it, not what those who oppose us have claimed regarding coercion and compulsion. This is the doctrine of the theologians of the Baghdādī school. Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf held that the people of the Hereafter are compelled in their actions, while al-Jubbā’ī and his son claimed that they are coerced into actions.

79 — Discourse on the People of the Hereafter: Do Reprehensible Acts Occur from Them?

And I say: The people of the Hereafter are of two categories:

One category consists of the people of Paradise. They are free from the need to commit reprehensible acts, and nothing of that sort occurs from them in any respect or for any reason, due to the abundance of their motives toward virtuous actions and the complete absence of motives for committing reprehensible acts from them in all states.

The second category consists of the people of the Fire. Reprehensible acts may occur from them, without obstinacy. Allah (swt) has said: *“If only you could see when they are made to stand before the Fire and they say: ‘Would that we might be returned, and not deny the signs of our Lord, and be among the believers.’ Rather, what they used to conceal before has become apparent to them. And if they were returned, they would surely return to what they were forbidden from; indeed, they are liars”* (Qur’ān 6:27–28).

And He (swt) has said: *“And on the Day We gather them all together, then We say to those who associated others [with Allah]: ‘Where are your partners whom you used to claim?’ Then their only excuse was that they said: ‘By Allah, our Lord, we were not polytheists.’ Look how they lied against themselves, and that which they used to fabricate has vanished from them”* (Qur’ān 6:22–24).

Thus He (swt) informed of their lying in the Hereafter, and lying is reprehensible in itself and false in all cases. This doctrine is likewise the doctrine of those whom we have mentioned among the theologians of the people of Baghdād. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila oppose this view.

80—Discourse on the Disconnected (*al-maqtū*) and the Connected (*al-mawṣūl*)

And I say: Every act that consists of multiple parts, which Allah (swt) has commanded to be performed in its completeness and has made obligatory or

recommended such that reward is deserved by it such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage, and the like of acts of obedience: if Allah (swt) knows that the servant will interrupt it before its completion by choice, or corrupt it deliberately by abandoning its perfection, then nothing of it occurs from him in the manner of drawing near (*qurbah*) to Him glorious is His Name.

Whenever an act is initiated truly for the sake of drawing near to Allah (swt) its doer will not interrupt it by choice, nor will he deliberately corrupt it by abandoning its perfection. Rather, he must necessarily complete it and carry it through until he performs it in its proper order, preferring that and choosing it willingly.

This chapter is connected in its meaning to the chapter on *al-muwāfah*. It is the doctrine of Hishām b. al-Fūṭī among the Mu‘tazila, Zurārah b. A‘yan, Muḥammad b. al-Ṭayyār, and a large group among the theologians of the Imāmiyyah. The majority of the Mu‘tazila, all of the Zaydiyyah, most of the anthropomorphists, and groups among the Murji‘ah oppose this view.

81 — Discourse on the Ruling of the Abode (*ḥukm al-dār*)

And I say: The ruling concerning an abode is according to what predominates within it. Every place in which unbelief predominates is an abode of unbelief (*dār kufr*); every place in which faith (*īmān*) predominates is an abode of faith (*dār īmān*); and every place in which Islām predominates without faith is an abode of Islām (*dār islām*). Allah (swt) said in describing Paradise: “*And excellent is the abode of the God-wary*” (Qur’ān 13:24) even though there are therein children and the insane. And He said in describing the Fire: “*I shall show you the abode of the transgressors*” (Qur’ān 7:145) even though therein are obedient angels of Allah. Thus He judged both abodes according to what predominates within them.

And I say: In light of what I have described, every region of the lands of Islām in which the two testimonies are manifest, the five daily prayers, the fast of

the month of Ramaḍān, the alms on wealth, and the belief in the obligation of pilgrimage to the Sacred House yet in which the doctrine of the Imāmah of the Family of Muḥammad (as) is not manifest is an abode of Islām, not an abode of faith. And every region of the lands of Islām whether its people are many or few in which the ordinances of Islām are manifest together with the doctrine of the Imāmah of the Family of Muḥammad (as) is an abode of Islām and an abode of faith.

In my view, an abode may be an abode of unbelief in creed (*kufr millah*) even while it is an abode of Islām; but it is not valid that it be so while it is an abode of faith. This is the doctrine of a group among the transmitters of reports from the Shī'a of the Family of Muḥammad (as). As for its general premises and foundational principles that I have mentioned, many among the people of i'tizāl have also held them.

Chapter: Discourse on the Subtle (*al-laṭīf*) Aspects of Theology

82 — Discourse on Substances (*al-jawāhir*)

Substances, according to me, are the indivisible parts from which bodies are composed. It is not permissible for any one of them, in itself, to be subject to division. Upon this doctrine are all the people of tawḥīd, except for a few among the people of i'tizāl. The atheists oppose this view, as do some who affiliate themselves with the monotheists among them Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Nazzām.

83—Discourse on Substances: Are They Homogeneous, or Is There Difference among Them?

And I say: All substances are homogeneous. They differ only by virtue of the differences that occur within them from among the accidents (*al-a'rāḍ*). Upon this doctrine is the majority of the monotheists.

84 — Discourse on Substances (*al-jawāhir*): Do They Possess Extension and Magnitudes in Themselves?

I say: Indeed, a substance has a magnitude in itself and a size by virtue of which it possesses a locus (*ḥayyiz*) in existence. By this it is distinguished in meaning from that which departs from its reality. Upon this doctrine are the majority of the people of tawḥīd.

85 — Discourse on the Locus (*ḥayyiz*) of Substances and States of Being (*al-akwān*)

And I say: Every substance has a locus in existence, and it does not exist without an accident by which it is situated in one of the directions, or in that which is estimated as such. This accident is termed by some of the theologians a *kawn* (state of being). Upon this doctrine are the majority of the people of tawḥīd.

86 — Discourse on Substances and the Accidents That Necessarily Accompany Them

I say: Every accident whose inherence in a substance is valid, and which the substance is capable of bearing in existence, the substance is not devoid of it or of that which substitutes for it among the accidents. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī, and before them the majority of the theologians. ‘Abd al-Salām b. Muḥammad al-Jubbā’ī opposed this view

and permitted substances to be devoid of colors, tastes, odors, and the like of such accidents.

87—Discourse on the Persistence of Substances (al-jawāhir)

I say: Indeed, substances are among those things for which persistence (al-baqā') is valid, and they exist for many periods of time. They do not pass away from the world except by the removal of persistence from them. Upon this general position are the majority of the monotheists. To it also goes Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī. He differs, however, regarding what we have mentioned concerning the cause of their perishing, from al-Jubbā'ī and his son, and from Banū Nawbakht among the Imāmiyyah and those who followed their path in this matter. Ibrāhīm al-Nazzām opposes them all and claims that Allah (swt) continually renews bodies and brings them into existence moment by moment.

88—Discourse on Substances: Do They Require a Place?

I say: Substances do not require places insofar as they are substances. However, when they move or are at rest, they necessarily require a place for movement and rest. Upon their being free of need for place in an absolute sense are all the monotheists; and regarding their need for place at the time of movement and rest is the majority of them. Al-Jubbā'ī and his son 'Abd al-Salām oppose this view.

89 — Discourse on Bodies (*al-ajsām*)

I say: Bodies are substances (*jawāhir*) that are composed with length, width, and depth. The least of which bodies are composed is eight parts: two of them, one of which is above the other, constitute length; two adjoin these two from the right or the left, thereby constituting width; and four correspond to these four, thereby constituting depth. Upon this doctrine is a group of the theologians.

Some have claimed that a body is composed of six parts; others have said that it is composed of four parts; and some have held that the reality of a body is composition itself, and that this may occur from two parts. Thus bodies are of the category of that which persists (*mimmā yabqā*). I have already mentioned this regarding individual substances and composition according to me, while all other accidents do not persist. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and a group before him among the Baghdādīs. No one among the people of tawḥīd has opposed the persistence of bodies except al-Nazzām, for he claimed that they are renewed moment by moment.

90 — Discourse on Accidents (*al-a'rāḍ*)

I say: Accidents are meanings that depend, in their existence, upon substrates (*maḥāl*). It is not permissible for any of them to persist (*al-baqā*). This is the doctrine of the majority of the Baghdādīs. The Baṣrans and others among the adherents of sects and opinions have opposed this view.

91 — Discourse on the Transformation of Accidents and Their Reinstatement

I say: That is impossible and not valid, based on proofs whose mention would be lengthy. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim [al-Balkhī] and all those among the monotheists who deny the persistence of accidents.

92 — Discourse on the Nonexistent (*al-ma'dūm*)

And I say: The nonexistent is that whose very entity is negated, excluded from the attribute of existence. And I say : it is neither body, nor substance, nor accident, nor a “thing” in reality. If I were to name it by any of these names, I would only be naming it so metaphorically. This is the doctrine of a group among the Baghdādī Mu'tazila and the proponents of createdness.

Al-Balkhī claims that it is a “thing,” but he does not name it body, substance, or accident. Al-Jubbā'ī and his son claim that the nonexistent is a “thing,” a substance, and an accident. Al-Khayyāṭ claims that it is a “thing,” an accident, and a body.

93 — Discourse on the Essence of the World (*māhiyyat al- 'ālam*)

And I say: The world is the heaven and the earth and whatever lies between them, and whatever is within them of substances and accidents. I do not know of any disagreement among the people of tawḥīd regarding this.

94 — Discourse on the Celestial Sphere (*al-falak*)

And I say: The celestial sphere is that which surrounds the earth and revolves around it. Within it are the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars. The earth is at its center like a point at the center of a circle. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and many among the people of tawḥīd, and it is the doctrine of most of the ancients and the astronomers. A group among the Baṣran Muʿtazila and others from among the sects have opposed this view.

95 — Discourse on the Motion of the Celestial Sphere

And I say: That which moves of the celestial sphere, from the aspect of possibility, is that part of it which is specified by place; and from the aspect of necessity, it is that which comes into contact with the air and traverses space by its motion. As for that which adjoins its upper surface, it is neither moving nor at rest, because it is not in a place.

And I say: That which moves of it moves only with circular motion, just as one who moves around a sphere moves. To this position go al-Balkhī, a group among the ancients, and many of the people of tawḥīd.

96 — Discourse on the Earth: Its Form, and Whether It Is in Motion or at Rest

I say: Indeed, the earth is in the form of a sphere, situated at the center of the celestial sphere, and it is at rest, not in motion. The cause of its rest is that it is at the center. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim [al-Balkhī], most of the ancients, and the astronomers. Al-Jubbāʾī, his son, and a group of others among the people of opinions and sects from the imitators among the theologians have opposed this view.

97 — Discourse on the Void (al-khalā') and the Plenum (al-malā')

And I say: Indeed, the world is filled with substances, and there is no void within it. Were there a void in it, it would not be possible to distinguish between aggregated and dispersed substances and bodies. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim [al-Balkhī] in particular among the Baghdādīs, and the doctrine of most of the ancients among the theologians. Al-Jubbā'ī, his son, and a group of theologians from among the ḥashwiyyah, the adherents of compulsion, and anthropomorphism oppose this view.

98 — Discourse on Place (*al-makān*)

And I say: Place is that which surrounds a thing from all its directions, and it is not valid that substances move except within places. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim and others among the Baghdādīs, and a group of the early theologians. Al-Jubbā'ī, his son, Banū Nawbakht, and those affiliated with kalām from among the adherents of compulsion and anthropomorphism oppose this view.

99 — Discourse on Time (*al-waqt*) and Duration (*al-zamān*)

And I say: *Time* (*al-waqt*) is that which the determiner (*al-muwaqqit*) designates as a time for a thing, and it is not a specific created entity. *Duration* (*al-zamān*) is a name applied to the motions of the celestial sphere. For this reason, the celestial sphere is not in need, for its existence, of time or duration. Upon this doctrine are all the monotheists.

100 — Discourse on Natures (*al-ṭibāʿ*)

And I say: Natures are meanings that inhere in substances, by which the substrate is prepared for being acted upon such as sight, and that nature within it by which it becomes prepared for the inhering of sensation and perception; and such as hearing, the nose in a sound state, and the uvula; and like its existence in fire, by which it burns, and by reason of which burning becomes possible through it. The matter in this regard, and what is similar to it, is clear, manifest, and evident.

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And I say: Whatever is generated by nature is only so by virtue of its cause acting in the object endowed with that nature, and that in reality there is no true action attributable to any of the natures themselves. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī. It is contrary to the doctrine of the Muʿtazila regarding natures, and also contrary to the doctrine of the materialist philosophers in what they have maintained concerning the actions of natures. Al-Jubbāʾī, his son, the *hashwiyyah*, and the adherents of createdness and compulsion rejected it.

101 — Discourse on the Composition of Bodies from Natures, and Their Transformation into the Elements (*al-ʿanāṣir / al-ustuqusāt*)

Many of the monotheists have held that all bodies are composed of the four natures (*al-ṭibāʿ al-arbaʿah*): heat, cold, moisture, and dryness. They argued for this on the basis of the dissolution of every body into these, and by what they observe of their transformation such as the transformation of water into

vapor and vapor into water, of lifeless matter into living beings and living beings into lifeless matter; and by the presence of the fiery, watery, airy, and earthy [aspects] within every body. They maintain that no body among bodies is free of this, that it is inconceivable otherwise, and that it dissolves into nothing other than these.

This matter is manifest and evident. I do not find a proof upon which I could rely to refute it, nor do I see it as corrupting anything of *tawḥīd*, justice (*al-ʿadl*), promise and threat (*al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd*), prophethood, or the religious laws. For this reason, I accept it. Rather, it is supportive of the religion and confirmatory of the proofs of God (swt) regarding His lordship, His wisdom, and His oneness. Among those who adhered to it from the leaders of the theologians was al-Nazzām, and al-Balkhī adopted it, along with those who followed him in this doctrine.

102 — Discourse on Will (*al-irādah*) and Its Necessitating Effect

And I say: The will, which is the intention to bring into existence one of two opposing alternatives that occur to the mind of the willing agent, necessarily brings about its object. It is impossible for it to exist while the object willed fails to occur immediately thereafter, unless that is prevented by the action of someone other than the willing agent.

This is the doctrine of Jaʿfar b. Ḥarb and a group of the Baghdādī theologians, and it is the doctrine of al-Balkhī. Opposed to it are al-Jubbāʾī and his son, the Baṣran Muʿtazila, the ḥashwiyyah, and the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-ijbār*).

103 — Discourse on Generation (*al-tawallud*)

And I say: Among the acts of the capable agent are those that occur as *generated* acts (*mutawalladah*), by means of causes that he initiates at the outset, without those generated acts themselves being directly initiated. Such as one who strikes another: the harm that occurs to him is generated from his exertions and movements, and the pain inflicted upon the one struck is generated from his striking him. Likewise is one who shoots at a target or at other bodies; and like one who presses with his tongue against his uvula, thereby generating sounds and speech, and things similar to this.

Thus, that which is initiated (*al-mubtada'*) among states is not generated. Rather, that which is caused by the initiated act such as what we have mentioned is generated from the act of the one who produced the cause.

This is the doctrine of all the people of justice (*ahl al-'adl*), except al-Nazzām and those who agreed with him among the adherents of *qadar* and compulsion (*al-ijbār*) in denying generation (*al-tawallud*).

104 — Discourse on the Distinction between the Necessitating (*al-mūjib*) and the Generated (*al-mutawallid*)

And I say: Every generated act is necessitated, but not every necessitated act is generated. The distinction between them is that the necessitating act which is not generated is that which immediately follows the will, without any intermediary, from the act of the willing agent; whereas the necessitating act that is generated is that which follows the act that itself follows the will.

This is a doctrine that I have abridged on the basis of my view regarding the originated act which the philosophers call *al-nafs* [the soul]. Its root lies in the doctrine of al-Balkhī and of those among the Baghdādī theologians who combined the necessitating effect of will with the doctrine of generation (*al-tawallud*).

105 — Discourse on the Kinds of Generating Causes and
Generated Acts (*anwāʿ al-muwallidāt wa-l-mutawalladāt min al-afʿāl*)

And I say: Reliances (*al-iʿtimādāt*), motions (*al-ḥarakāt*), contacts (*al-mumāsāt*), separations (*al-mutabāyināt*), reflection (*al-naẓar*), beliefs (*al-iʿtiqādāt*), knowledges (*al-ʿulūm*), pleasures (*al-ladhdhāt*), and pains (*al-ālām*) all of these generate their like and their opposite. None of what we have mentioned is, with respect to generation, more specific than any other among those we have named.

And I say: An agent may generate in another knowledge of certain things when he performs upon him the causes of that knowledge such as one who shouts at a heedless person and thereby produces in him knowledge of the shout, generated from the act of shouting at him. The indication of this is that it is not possible for him to refrain from knowing it when he hears what has suddenly reached him of the shout. Likewise, one who strikes another generates, by his striking, pain within him; and he generates within him knowledge of the pain and of the striking, due to the impossibility of his lacking awareness of the pain in that state.

Likewise, a person may generate in another grief, joy, sorrow, and fear by presenting to him matters such that grief, joy, anguish, and fear become unavoidable for him, and it is not possible for him to refrain from them under any circumstance and other similar cases whose mention would lengthen the discussion.

This is the doctrine of many among the Baghdādī Muʿtazila; Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī adopted it. Al-Jubbāʾī and his son opposed much of it, while al-Nazzām and the adherents of compulsion (*al-mujbirah*) rejected it in its entirety.

106 — Discourse on Whether Commanding the Cause Is a
Command of the Effect

And I say: Commanding the cause is a command of the effect, so long as the command does not prohibit the effect, nor is it known that the agent of the cause will prevent the effect. As for commanding the effect, it necessarily entails commanding the cause; rather, it is a command of it in meaning, even if it is not so in wording. I do not know of any disagreement in this matter among those who affirm *tawallud* (generation).

107 — Discourse on the Acts of God (swt) and Whether There Are Generated Effects in Them

And I say: In many of the acts of God (swt) there are caused effects (musabbabāt). I refrain from applying to them the descriptive term “generated” (mutawalladāt), even though they are so in meaning, because in what I apply to the attributes of God (swt) and the attributes of His acts, I follow the Law and do not innovate. The Muslims have applied to many of the acts of God (swt) the terms “causes” and “effects,” but I have not found them applying to them the term “generated.” Whoever among them has applied it has not relied upon any authoritative proof in doing so, nor resorted to the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus. This is a doctrine I have adopted for the reasoning I have mentioned, and for other proofs whose mention is not appropriate here.

As for my position regarding causes, it is the doctrine of a group among the Baghdādīs, and approximately the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim, and of Abū ‘Alī. Abū Hāshim b. Abī ‘Alī alone, among the people of justice, opposed this view.

God (swt) has said what testifies to its correctness:

“And He is the One who sends the winds as glad tidings before His mercy, until, when they carry heavy clouds, We drive them to a dead land and send down thereby water, and bring forth thereby fruits of every kind. Thus do We bring forth the dead, so that you may remember.” (Qur’ān 7:57)

And He said:

“Have you not seen that God sends down water from the sky, then causes it to flow as springs in the earth; then He brings forth thereby crops of differing colors; then they wither, and you see them turn yellow...” (Qur’ān 39:21)

And the verses in the Qur’ān indicating this meaning are many.

108 — Discourse on Desire (*al-shahwah*)

And I say: Desire is an expression for two meanings. One of them is the natural disposition specific to animals, which calls them toward that which suits them in respect of pleasures; the other meaning is the inclination of that natural disposition toward particular entities, in detail, from among pleasures.

As for the first, it is from the act of God—glorified and (swt) without doubt or hesitation, because the animal does not possess it, nor does it have any choice in it. As for the second, it is from the act of the animal itself, by proofs whose explanation would be lengthy.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the Baghdādīs. The Baṣrans [oppose this] by asserting the unity of what exists or of what is prevented from existing and that is impossible. Likewise is the case with prohibition, for it is the opposite of command. This is the doctrine of all the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*), except for those among them who are of no consequence; and the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) are opposed to them in this matter.

109 — Discourse on Substitution (*al-badal*)

And I say: Disbelief (*al-kufr*) was permitted to occur, at the time of faith (*al-īmān*), as a substitute for it; and faith was permitted to occur, at the time of disbelief, as a substitute for it. I do not say, however, that during the state of faith disbelief is permitted to exist within it as a substitute for it, nor that faith is permitted to exist during the state of disbelief as a substitute for it.

That is because the permissibility (*jawāz*) of a thing means affirming its possibility and the soundness of its occurrence, and the removal of its impossibility. Disbelief is the opposite of faith, and the existence of one opposite negates the permissibility of the existence of the other, just as it negates its actual existence. Thus, if one were to say: “The disbeliever may perform faith, which is a substitute for disbelief,” this would entail the permissibility of the coexistence of two opposites. But if one says, “It was permitted (*qad kāna yajūzu*)” by preceding the term *kāna* (“was”) before *yajūzu* (“is permitted”) this does not entail an impossibility.

As for the statement that faith is permitted from the disbeliever in future times of disbelief, and that disbelief is likewise permitted from the believer, this is not objectionable, due to the removal of opposition and impossibility. This statement is not the point of disagreement between us and the determinists (*al-mujbirah*). Rather, their disagreement with us lies in the first matter. Upon this position are the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*), just as all the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-ijbār*) are opposed to them in it.

110 — Discourse on the Creation of That Which Has No Lesson (*‘ibrah*) and No Benefit (*ṣalāh*) in It

And I say: The creation of that which holds no lesson for any of the morally responsible (*al-mukallaḥ*), and in which there is no benefit for any of the created beings, is frivolity (*‘abath*), and it is not permissible for God (swt). This is the doctrine of the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). All the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-jabr*) have gone to the contrary of it.

Many people have been confused in this matter by the creation of what lies in the depths of the seas, the heights of the mountains, and the interiors of animals things that no human being perceives. Thus, the aspect of benefit in them became hidden from them, and the path of taking admonition through observing them was closed to them, so they opposed the people of truth regarding what we have stated.

The matter in this chapter, however, is not as they imagined. For even if humans do not perceive much of what has been described, the jinn and the angels perceive it and take admonition thereby. And whatever does not fall under the perception of any perceiving sense is either a benefit for something that takes admonition by it, or it is a necessary concomitant of the natures of things whose existence is indispensable among the divine graces (*alṭāf*) toward the servants.

We need no more, in affirming the soundness of this principle, than to establish the proof that God (swt) is Independent, Generous, and Wise, and that He does not create anything for Himself. Rather, He creates what He brings into existence for others. Were what He created to be devoid of any benefit for others while it is established by proof that its Maker, exalted is His greatness, does not benefit from it then it would be frivolity without meaning. And God is exalted far above committing frivolity, with a lofty exaltation.

111 — Discourse on Pain and Pleasure When They Are Equal in Gentleness (*al-luṭf*) and Benefit (*al-ṣalāḥ*)

And I say: If the infliction of pain upon an animal and the granting of pleasure to it were equal with respect to gentleness toward the morally responsible (*al-mukallaḥ*) and their religious benefits, then it would not be permissible for the Wise (swt) to inflict pain rather than pleasure. For in that case there would be no motive for inflicting pain except compensation for it; and the Eternal (swt) is capable of providing the like of such compensation as a pure favor. Thus, it would be more fitting, in accordance with His generosity and mercy, that He grant pleasure due to its nobility over pain and not inflict pain when that which is more noble than it is equal to it in benefit.

This is the doctrine of many among the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). A group among them have opposed it, and all the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) are opposed to it.

112 — Discourse on God’s Knowledge (swt) that a Servant Would Believe If He Were Granted Continued Life after His Disbelief, or Would Repent If He Were Granted Continued Life after His Sinfulness: Is It Permissible to Cause Him to Die before That, or Not?

And I say: That is not permissible in the case of one who has not invalidated his repentance nor returned to disbelief after abandoning it. It is, however, permissible after granting respite in the case of one who was given reprieve and then returned to disobedience. For if this were obligatory in all cases without exception, it would depart from wisdom into frivolity, and there would be no reward for moral responsibility (*al-taklīf*).

This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Ka‘bī and many among the proponents of *al-aṣḥaḥ* (the principle of what is most beneficial). The Baṣran Mu‘tazila, those among them who deny *al-luṭf*, and all the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) oppose this view.

113 — Discourse on Pain for the Sake of Benefit without Compensation

And I say: Compensation (*al-‘iwāḍ*) for pain inflicted upon one by which another is benefited is due from God (swt) by justice, even though it is obligatory, with respect to its occurrence, upon those believers for whom it is permissible that they inflict such pain. As for pains by which non-believers are benefited, compensation for them is indispensable; otherwise it would be

injustice. For this reason I said: “The infliction of pain upon the disbeliever does not entitle him to compensation, because it occurs only as punishment for him and as a means of reform for him in himself, even though it may be permissible that others are benefited thereby.”

This is the doctrine of those among the people of justice and *irjā'* who deny *iḥbāṭ* (the nullification of deeds). Opposed to it are the Baghdādī Mu'tazila, the Baṣrans, and all the determinists (*al-mujbirah*).

I have combined in this matter principles whose combination is particular to me, distinct from those who agree with me in justice and *irjā'*, according to what reflection has disclosed to me of its soundness. I am not unsettled by those who oppose me in it, for with proof I have the greatest intimacy, and there is no estrangement from the truth. And praise belongs to Allah.

114 — Discourse on Compensating Animals and Retaliation of Some of Them against Others

And I say: It is obligatory, by the generosity and munificence of God (swt) to compensate animals for the pains that befall them in this world, whether that pain is from His act (jjh) or from the act of others. For He created them for their benefit; and if He were to withhold compensation from them for their pain, He would have created them for their harm. God is exalted above creating anything for its harm and inflicting pain upon it without conveying to it some benefit, for such an act proceeds only from one who is foolish and unjust. God (swt) is Just, Generous, Wise, and Knowing.

As for retaliation (*al-qīṣāṣ*) among them, it is not permissible, because they are not morally responsible (*mukallaf*), nor commanded, nor aware of the reprehensibility of reprehensible acts. Retaliation is a form of punishment, and it is not wise to punish one who is not morally responsible, nor one who has not been prohibited from committing a reprehensible act. If retaliation of some of them against others were permissible, then it would also be permissible to punish them for their offenses against one another, and it would be obligatory

to reward them for their acts of beneficence toward one another and all of that is impossible.

This is the doctrine of many among the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). Some among them, and a group besides them, have opposed it.

115 — Discourse on Whether the Bliss of the People of Paradise Is a Grace (*tafaḍḍul*) or a Reward (*thawāb*)

And I say: The bliss of the people of Paradise is of two kinds. One kind of it is pure grace (*tafaḍḍul mahḍ*), containing no aspect of reward whatsoever; and the other kind is grace from one perspective and reward from another. There is no bliss of the people of Paradise that is purely reward without being grace in any respect.

As for the pure grace, it is that bliss which children, the feeble-minded, and animals enjoy, for these have no deeds with which they were charged, such that wisdom would require rewarding them for them.

As for the other kind, it is the bliss of those who were morally responsible (*al-mukallaḥ*). It is grace toward them because, had it been withheld from them, they would not have been wronged, since what God (swt) had already bestowed upon them beforehand of His blessings, bounty, and beneficence necessitated upon them gratitude to Him, obedience to Him, and abstention from disobedience to Him. Thus, had He not rewarded them after their deeds nor bestowed bliss upon them, He would not have been unjust toward them. For this reason, His rewarding them is grace.

Yet it is also reward, because their deeds necessitated by the generosity and munificence of God (swt) their enjoyment of bliss, and resulted in reward for them and bore its fruit for them. Thus, it became reward from this perspective, even though it is grace from the perspective we have described.

This is the doctrine of many among the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*) from the Mu‘tazila and the Shī‘a. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila, the Jahmiyyah, and those among the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) who followed them oppose this view.

116 — Discourse on Worldly Reward and Punishment, and the Hastening of Recompense Therein

And I say: God (swt) rewards some of His creatures for their obedience in this world with a portion of what they deserve of reward. It is not valid that He give them their full recompense therein, due to what is required of the perpetuity of the recompense of the obedient. And He may punish some of His creatures in this world for their acts of disobedience therein with a portion of what they deserve for their opposition to Him and sometimes with all of it as well because not every act of disobedience to Him merits everlasting punishment, just as we have mentioned with respect to acts of obedience.

God (swt) has said:

“And whoever is mindful of God, He will make for him a way out, and provide for him from where he does not expect.” (Qur’ān 65:2–3)

And He said:

“So I said, ‘Seek forgiveness of your Lord; indeed, He is Ever-Forgiving. He will send down upon you the sky in abundant rain, and will reinforce you with wealth and children, and will make for you gardens, and will make for you rivers.’” (Qur’ān 71:10–12)

Thus, He promised them various kinds of worldly goods in this world in return for righteous deeds.

And He said regarding some who disobeyed Him:

“And whoever turns away from My remembrance, for him is a constrained life, and We shall raise him blind on the Day of Resurrection.” (Qur’ān 20:124)

And He said regarding others among them:

“We shall make them taste the punishment of disgrace in the life of this world, and the punishment of the Hereafter is greater.” (Qur’ān 41:16)

And: “*For them is punishment in the life of this world, and the punishment of the Hereafter is more severe, and they have no protector against God.*” (Qur’ān 13:34)

Reports have also been transmitted abundantly from the Prophet (saww) that he said: “*A day of fever is an expiation for the sins of a year.*” And he said: “*Maintaining ties of kinship prolongs one’s lifespan.*”

This is the doctrine of a group among the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). Its elaboration, as I have stated regarding the hastening of some of the reward and all of the punishment or some of it is the doctrine of the majority of the Shī‘a and many among the Murji’a.

117 — Discourse on Choice (*al-ikhtiyār*) with Respect to a Thing, and Whether It Is Identical to Will (*al-irādah*)

And I say: Willing a thing is choosing it, and choosing it is willing it and preferring it. This term is sometimes used to express the meaning of intending one of two opposites, and it is also used to express the occurrence of an act with knowledge of it and without compulsion toward it. The term “*chooser*” (*mukhtār*) is also applied specifically to the capable agent, by which is meant that he is empowered to perform an act and its opposite, without intending by that the meaning of intention or resolve.

This is the doctrine of a group among the Baghdādī Mu‘tazila and many of the Shī‘a. The Baṣran Mu‘tazila and all the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-jabr*) oppose this view.

118 — Discourse on the Will That Is Nearness (*al-irādah allatī hiya taqarrub*)

And I say : The will that constitutes nearness (*taqarrub*) is like the other wills that precede actions. It is not valid for it to accompany the action, because the action does not come into existence except as an act of nearness. It is impossible for the will to be attached to something already existent, or for there to be a will for it insofar as it is nearness when it has already occurred as such.

As for its being itself nearness, that is because its object (*murād*) is so; and the ruling of the will with respect to goodness and badness, nearness and remoteness, follows the ruling of its object.

This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). The Baṣran Mu‘tazila oppose it, as do the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-ijbār*).

119 — Discourse on Whether the Will (*al-irādah*) Is Willed by Itself, or by Another Will, or Whether It Does Not Require a Will at All

And I say: The will does not require a will [for its own occurrence], for if it were to require that, it would not come into existence except through the emergence of an infinite regress of wills and this is manifestly impossible. Nor is it valid that the will be willed by itself, because the nature of the will is that its object (*murād*) precedes it; thus, if it were obligatory or even permissible that the will be willed by itself, it would be obligatory or permissible for it to exist before itself and this is the very essence of impossibility.

Some of our speculative theologians have used the expression that “the will is willed by itself,” intending by it the acts of God (swt) that proceed from Him, namely His origination and bringing into existence, since these are identical with His will, even though they do not occur from Him by means of another will. Yet this expression is metaphorical and figurative. The accurate position is what we have stated.

This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī, many of the Baghdādīs before him, and a group of the Shī‘a. Others among them, as well as some of the Baṣrans and all the adherents of compulsion (*al-mujbirah*), oppose this view.

120 — Discourse on Martyrdom (*al-shahādah*)

And I say: Martyrdom is a rank deserved by one who endures patiently in supporting the religion of God (swt) with a patience that leads to the spilling of his blood and the departure of his soul, without weakness on his part in obedience to Him (swt). It is the rank by which its possessor, on the Day of Resurrection, is among the witnesses of God and His trustees; among those whose rank is elevated with God and whose station is magnificent, until he becomes a *ṣiddīq* with God—accepted in speech—whose testimony joins the proofs among the witnesses of God, present in the station of those who bear witness to the gravest matters alongside the prophets of God—may blessings be upon them.

God (swt) said: *“So that God may know those who believe and take from among you witnesses; and God does not love the wrongdoers.”* (Qur’ān 3:140)

And He said: *“Those are the truthful ones and the witnesses with their Lord.”* (Qur’ān 57:19)

Thus, desiring martyrdom from God (swt) is nothing other than desiring from Him success in patience that leads to what we have described. It is not a desire for the act of the disbelievers namely, killing the believers for that is immorality and misguidance; and God (swt) is far above encouraging His servants toward the acts of the disbelievers of killing and the deeds of the wrongdoers.

Rather, the expression “desire for martyrdom” is used according to the customary usage of the expression “desire for reward,” which is an act of God (swt) toward one who has become deserving of it by his righteous deeds. A person may also desire from God (swt) success in performing some of his possible acts; thus the desire is attached to the mention of the act itself rather

than to the success for it just as the pilgrim says: “O Allah, grant me return to Your Sacred House.” The return is his act, yet he is in fact asking for success therein and assistance upon it. And he says: “O Allah, grant me jihād and grant me fasting the month of Ramaḍān,” while his intent thereby is assistance in jihād and fasting.

This is the doctrine of all the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). Those who opposed it are the adherents of *qadar* and compulsion (*al-ijbār*).

121 — Discourse on Divine Aid (*al-naṣr*) and Abandonment (*al-khidhlān*)

And I say: Divine aid from God (swt) occurs in two forms.

The first of them is the establishment of proof and the clarification of evidence in favor of the one who is in the right. This is the most emphatic of the divine graces (*al-altāf*) in calling toward following the truth, and it is the true form of divine aid. God (swt) said: “*Indeed, We shall surely aid Our messengers and those who believe in the life of this world and on the Day when the witnesses arise.*” (Qur’ān 40:51) And He (jjh) said: “*God has decreed: ‘I shall surely prevail, I and My messengers.’ Indeed, God is Strong, Mighty.*” (Qur’ān 58:21) The prevailing mentioned here is by means of proof alone, since many of His messengers were overcome by wrongdoers and their blood was shed by the false ones.

The second form is the strengthening of the hearts of the believers in battles and at the time of encountering adversaries, the sending down of tranquility upon them, the weakening of the affair of their enemies, the casting of terror into their hearts, and the imposing of fear and panic upon them. Included in this is support by angels and others among the helpers, by means of the graces and causes of success that He dispatches them with, in accordance with what reason requires and what the Written Book has indicated.

Abandonment (*al-khidhlān*) likewise occurs in two forms, each of which is the opposite of its corresponding form of aid and contrary to it in wisdom.

This is the doctrine of all the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*) from among the Shī‘a, the Mu‘tazila, the Murji‘a, the Khārijites, and the Zaydiyya. All the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) oppose this view, for they claim that aid is the strength of the one aided, and abandonment is the capacity of the disobedient one who is abandoned even though they have further elaborations on this after that.

122 — Discourse on Sealing (*al-ṭab‘*) and Sealing (*al-khatm*)

And I say: *Ṭab‘* (sealing) from God (swt) upon the hearts, and *khatm* (sealing), are one and the same in meaning. It is testimony upon them that they do not comprehend the Reminder by choice, nor do they rely upon guidance by preference, without compulsion. This usage is well-known in the language. Do you not see their saying: “I have sealed (*khatamtū*) upon so-and-so that he will not prosper,” by which they mean: “I have decisively borne testimony against him and informed concerning him”? And sealing (*al-ṭab‘*) upon a thing is nothing but a mark placed by the one who seals it.

Thus, when testimony from God (swt) upon a thing serves as a sign for His servants, it is permissible to call it sealing (*ṭab‘*) and sealing (*khatm*). This proceeds consistently upon the principles of the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*), whereas the doctrines of the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) are contrary to it.

123 — Discourse on Loyalty (*al-wilāyah*) and Enmity (*al-‘adāwah*)

And I say: The servant’s loyalty to God (swt) is different from God’s loyalty to him, and His enmity toward him is different from the servant’s enmity toward Him.

As for the servant’s loyalty to God (swt) it is to be encompassed within obedience to Him, to hold the belief in the obligation of thanking Him, and to abandon disobedience to Him. In my view, this is not sound except after knowledge of Him.

As for God's (swt) loyalty to His servant, it is His obligating reward for him and His approval of his act.

As for the servant's enmity toward God (swt) it is his disbelief in Him, his denial of His blessings and beneficence, and his committing acts of disobedience with obstinate opposition to His command and contempt for His prohibition. None of this occurs from him except together with ignorance of Him.

As for God's (swt) enmity toward the servant, it is His obligating perpetual punishment for him, His nullifying the entitlement to reward for any of his acts, and His judgment of curse upon him and dissociation from him and from his acts.

Along with this I say: God's loyalty to the believer may occur during the state of his faith, and His enmity toward the disbeliever likewise occurs during the state of his disbelief and misguidance. This is a doctrine that accords with the principles of the people of justice (*ahl al-'adl*) and *irjā'*. Some of the Mu'tazila in particular adopted part of it, and among the determinists (*al-mujbirah*) there is agreement with part of it. Its totality belongs to those who combine the doctrine of justice with the doctrine of the proponents of *al-muwāfāh* from the Murji'a.

As for the claim that God (swt) may be an enemy to one whose loyalty to Him is valid thereafter, or may show loyalty to one whom it is valid for Him to be an enemy toward, our statement concerning this has already preceded in the chapter on *al-muwāfāh*.

124 — Discourse on *Taqiyyah*

And I say: *Taqiyyah* is permissible in religion when there is fear for one's life. It may also be permissible in certain situations, to the exclusion of others, due to fear for one's property and for various forms of prudent rectification (*istiṣlāḥ*). I further say that it may at times be obligatory and thus a duty; at other times it may be permissible without being obligatory; and it may at one time be better than abandoning it, while at another time abandoning it may be

better although the one who practices it is excused and pardoned, by grace, from blame for it.

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And I say: It is permissible in all statements when necessity requires it, and it may even become obligatory therein due to a form of gentleness (*lutf*) or prudent rectification. It is not permissible in actions involving the killing of believers, nor in matters that are known or strongly presumed to entail corruption in religion. This is a doctrine that proceeds from the principles of the people of justice and the people of Imāmiyyah in particular, to the exclusion of the Mu‘tazilah, the Zaydiyyah, the Khārijites, and the general populace who style themselves the people of ḥadīth.

125 — Discourse on the Name and the Named

And I say: The name is other than the named, as has preceded in the discourse on attributes that the attribute, in reality, is other than the one described. This is a doctrine shared by the Shī‘a and the Mu‘tazilah altogether, while the general populace and the determinists among the anthropomorphists oppose them in its meaning.

126 — Discourse on Enjoining What Is Right and Forbidding What Is Wrong

And I say: Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong by the tongue is a collective obligation (*farḍ kifāyah*), on the condition that there is need for it either to establish proof against one who has no knowledge except by its mention, or to obtain knowledge that there is benefit in it, or to have a predominant presumption of that. As for extending the hand therein, it is connected to the authority of the ruler and to his obligating it upon one whom

he appoints to it and grants permission therein; it is not permissible to alter this stated condition.

This is a doctrine branching from the affirmation of justice and the doctrine of Imamate, to the exclusion of other views.

127 — Discourse on One Who Discharges an Obligation with Unlawful Wealth: Does It Suffice for Him or Not?

And I say: The obligations of God (swt) do not suffice for one who commits His prohibition within their limits, because they are only considered discharged by complying with His command therein in the manner that merits reward for them. Thus, if the morally responsible person violates the limit therein, transgresses the prescribed boundary, and performs the act in the manner that He has prohibited, then he is disobedient, sinful, deserving of punishment and blame. It is impossible that the obligations of God (swt) be acts of disobedience to Him, or that nearness to Him be attained through opposing Him, or that what merits reward be that which necessitates punishment.

It is therefore established that the obligations of God (swt) are not discharged except through obedience within their limits, and by avoiding opposition to Him in their conditions. As for what is performed in the manner of obedience sound in its conditions, limits, and pillars, without opposing God (swt) then it is validly discharging (*mujzi'*), even if it is connected in existence with reprehensible acts that do not affect what we have mentioned regarding the limits of the obligation and its pillars.

This is a foundational principle by knowing which one distinguishes what suffices of deeds from what does not suffice among ambiguous cases. It is the doctrine of the majority of the Imāmiyyah, many of the Mu'tazilah, and a group among the people of ḥadīth.

128 — Discourse on Aiding the Oppressors, Working under Them, Following Them, Earning from Them, and Benefiting from Their Wealth

And I say: Assisting the oppressors in matters of truth, and undertaking for them what is obligatory, is permissible and in some circumstances obligatory. As for assisting them in oppression and transgression, it is prohibited and not permissible when done by choice.

As for engaging with them in offices and works, it is not permissible except for one whom the Imām of the time has granted permission, and in accordance with the conditions he stipulates upon him in actions. This ruling is specific to the people of Imāmiyyah, to the exclusion of others, for reasons whose explanation would lengthen the book.

As for following them, there is no harm in it in matters whose apparent aspect does not entail harm to the people of faith, and which are not predominantly employed in disobedience.

As for earning from them, it is permissible as we have described; and benefiting from their wealth although it is mixed is lawful for those believers we have specified, to the exclusion of the rest of humankind.

As for the wealth of the people of knowledge in particular, when it is specified and delimited and found in their possession, it is not lawful for anyone to take anything from it by choice. If one is compelled to do so, as one is compelled to consume carrion and blood, then it is permissible to take from it to remove the necessity, without excess, as we have explained.

This is a doctrine specific to the people of Imāmiyyah alone, and I do not know of anyone among the opponents who agrees with them in it.

129 — Discourse on Consensus (al-ijmā‘)

And I say: The consensus of the ummah is a proof (ḥujjah) because it necessarily includes the statement of the Proof (al-ḥujjah). Likewise, the consensus of the Shī'ah is a proof for the same reason unlike other consensuses.

The foundation in this chapter is the establishment of the truth by means of the statement of the Imām who stands in the place of the Prophet (saww). Thus, if he alone were to state a position, even if no one among mankind agreed with him, that would suffice as proof and evidence.

We have only deemed consensus to be a proof on account of him and mentioned it for this reason: because it is impossible for consensus to occur except while he is included in it, for he is the greatest of the ummah in rank, and the one foremost over all others in virtues and in the finest statements and actions.

This is the doctrine specific to the people of Imāmiyyah, and the Mu'tazilah, the Murji'ah, the Khārijites, and the people of ḥadīth among the Qadariyyah and the people of compulsion oppose them in this matter.

130 — Discourse on Solitary Reports (Akḥbār al-Āḥād)

And I say: Knowledge is not obligatory, nor is action obligatory, on the basis of anything from solitary reports (akḥbār al-āḥād). It is not permissible for anyone to assert certainty in religion on the basis of a single report unless it is accompanied by something that clearly indicates the truthfulness of its transmitter. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Shī'ah, many of the Mu'tazilah, the Muḥakkimah, and a group among the Murji'ah; and it is contrary to what the jurists of the general populace and the people of opinion hold.

131 — Discourse on Quotation (al-ḥikāyah) and That Which Is Quoted (al-maḥkī)

And I say: The quotation of the Qur'ān may be called "Qur'ān," even though in meaning it is other than the quoted original in the manner clarified. Likewise, the quotation of any speech is named by that speech without qualification. Thus it is said of one who quotes the poetry of al-Nābighah: "So-and-so recited the poetry of al-Nābighah," and "We heard from so-and-so the poetry of Zuhayr." In the same way it is said of one who complies with the command of the Messenger of God (saww) in religion and acts upon it: "So-and-so practices the religion of the Messenger of God (saww)." This expression is used absolutely, without restriction, even though its meaning is as we have explained the meaning of quotation in reality. This is the doctrine of the majority of the Mu'tazilah, and the people of compulsion among the Jabriyyah oppose it.

132 — Discourse on the Abrogating (al-Nāsikh) and the Abrogated (al-Mansūkh) of the Qur'ān

And I say: In the Qur'ān there is abrogating and abrogated, just as there is decisive (muḥkam) and ambiguous (mutashābih), in accordance with what God knew of the interests of the servants. God (swt) said: *"Whatever verse We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring one better than it or the like of it."* (Qur'ān 2:106)

Abrogation, in my view, in the Qur'ān is only the abrogation of the rulings contained therein; it is not the removal of the very substance of what was revealed, as many of the opponents have claimed. Among the abrogated in the Qur'ān is His (swt) saying: *"And those of you who die and leave wives behind [there is] a bequest for their wives: provision for a year without expulsion."* (Qur'ān 2:240) By the ruling of this verse, the waiting period ('iddah) due to death was one year. Then it was abrogated by His (swt) saying: *"And those of*

you who die and leave wives behind—let them wait by themselves for four months and ten days.” (Qur’ān 2:234)

This ruling became established with the establishment of the Shari‘ah of Islam. The former ruling was abrogated, while the verse concerning it remained established and un-abrogated; it remains in recitation, just as its abrogating verse does, without disagreement. This is the doctrine of the Shi‘ah, a group among the People of Ḥadīth, most of the Muḥakkimah, and the Zaydiyyah. The Mu‘tazilah and a group of the Jabriyyah oppose this, claiming that abrogation has occurred in the very texts of the verses just as it has occurred in the rulings. A few individuals affiliated with the Mu‘tazilah have opposed the consensus and denied abrogation in the Qur’ān altogether. It has also been related from a group among them that they denied abrogation in the Shari‘ah of Islam in general, rejecting that God has abrogated anything from it in any respect or for any reason.

133 — Discourse on the Abrogation of the Qur’ān by the Sunnah

And I say: The Qur’ān abrogates some of itself, and the Sunnah does not abrogate anything of it. Rather, the Sunnah is abrogated by it, just as the Sunnah is abrogated by another Sunnah like it. God (swt) is He said: *“Whatever verse We abrogate or cause to be forgotten, We bring one better than it or the like of it.”*

It is not valid that anything should be comparable to the Book of God (swt) nor can the speech of any of His creation be better than it. There is no sound meaning in the statement of the opponents that *“better than it”* refers to being better in terms of benefit (maṣlaḥah), for a thing does not become better than its counterpart merely by being more beneficial for someone else. Such usage is neither sanctioned by the Shar‘ nor supported by precise linguistic analysis. If that were the case, then punishment would be better than reward, and Iblīs better than the angels and the prophets—peace be upon them—and this is corrupt and impossible.

The doctrine that the Sunnah does not abrogate the Qur'ān is the position of most of the Shī'ah, and of a group among the jurists and the People of Ḥadīth. Many jurists and theologians oppose it.

134 — Discourse on the Creation of Paradise and Hell

And I say: Paradise and Hell are, at this present time, created. Thus have the reports come, and upon it is the consensus of the people of the Shar' and the transmitters of traditions. The Mu'tazilah, the Khārijites, and a group of the Zaydiyyah opposed this doctrine. Most of those we have named claimed that what we have stated regarding their creation falls under what is *possible* (jā'iz) rather than *necessary* (wājib), and they suspended judgment regarding the transmitted reports about it. Those who remained among them went so far as to declare the creation of Paradise and Hell impossible.

They differed in their reasoning. Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā'ī said that this is impossible, because it necessitates the annihilation of the world before its resurrection, and the annihilation of some bodies entails the annihilation of all of them; while consensus has already been established that God (swt) does not annihilate Paradise and Hell. Others who preceded Abū Hāshim said that creating them at this present time would be vain and without meaning, and God (swt) does not act in vain, nor does corruption proceed from Him.

135 — Discourse on the Speech of the Limbs, Their Utterance, and Their Testimony

And I say: what the Qur'ān contains concerning the mention of this is by way of metaphor (isti'ārah), not in literal reality, just as God (swt) said: *"Then He turned to the heaven while it was smoke, and He said to it and to the earth: Come, willingly or unwillingly. They said: We come willingly"* (Qur'ān 41:11)

and there was no speech from either of them in reality. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and a group among the people of justice (ahl al-‘adl). Many of the Mu‘tazilah, as well as all the anthropomorphists and the determinists, oppose this view.

136 — Discourse on the Punishment of the Dead Due to the Weeping of the Living over Him

And I say: this would be injustice, which is not permissible according to the justice and wisdom of God (swt). Rather, the report concerning this is that the Prophet (saww) passed by a Jewish man who had died while his family were weeping over him, and he said: *“They are weeping over him while he is being punished.”* He did not say that he is punished because of their weeping over him. This is the doctrine of all the people of justice, and the people of predestination and compulsion oppose it.

137 — Discourse on the Speech of ‘Īsā (as) in the Cradle

And I say: the speech of ‘Īsā (as) occurred with complete intellect, established responsibility (taklīf), and after the performance of a duty that proceeded from him, and a prophethood that was granted to him. The apparent wording of the revelation is proof of this in the saying of God (swt): *“He said: Indeed I am the servant of God; He has given me the Book and made me a prophet”* (Qur’ān 19:30)

This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah and a group from among other Shī‘ī circles. A number of the Mu‘tazilah and many of the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth have also held this view, while the Khārijites, some of the Zaydiyyah, and factions of the Mu‘tazilah have opposed it.

138 — Discourse on the Speech of the Insane and the Child, and Whether There Is Truth or Falsehood in It

And I say: this may occur in what is specified in wording by a particular designation, since it is a specific meaning, such as the statement of one who says: “*The Lord of the worlds is One,*” or “*The Creator of all creation is two,*” or “*Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib is truthful,*” or “*Mūsā b. ‘Imrān, sent to the Children of Israel, is a liar*”, and the like of that. As for statements whose reports are ambiguous in wording and meaning, no judgment of truthfulness or falsehood is passed upon them until the intent of the speaker and his intention therein are known. This is the doctrine of a group among the people of justice (ahl al-‘adl), among them Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī; it is also held by some of the justice-oriented Shī‘ah and a faction of the Murji‘ah. Some of the Mu‘tazilah, a group of the Khārijites, and the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth oppose this view.

139 — Discourse on the Essence (Māhiyyah) of Speech

And I say: speech is the segmentation of sounds and their ordering in a manner that conveys intelligible meanings. Sounds, in my view, are a class of accidents (a‘rāḍ), and it is not valid for speech to subsist, since that is impossible for all accidents; moreover, if speech were to subsist, then the earlier letters of a word would not be more deserving of precedence nor the later ones more deserving of delay, which would lead to the corruption of speech and the nullification of mutual understanding in every respect. This is the doctrine of a group of the Mu‘tazilah; some of them, and all the anthropomorphists, oppose it.

140 — Discourse on Repentance from the Generated Act Before Its Existence or After It

And I say: repentance is not valid from any act before its existence, whether it be direct or generated (*mutawallad*). Thus, whoever performs a cause by which he necessitates a consequent, then regrets the performance of the cause before the consequent comes into existence, his punishment for the cause and for the consequent falls away, even though he is not, in reality, regretful regarding the consequent not because he is persisting in it or treating it lightly, but because regret is not valid for him until it comes into existence, nor repentance until it has been committed. However, once it comes into existence and there is no impediment preventing it, repentance from it becomes obligatory if the doer is capable. This is the doctrine of the majority of the proponents of generation (*aṣḥāb al-tawallud*).

Some of them have opposed this and claimed that repentance from the cause is repentance from the consequent. Others said that by performing the cause one is like the doer of the consequent, and therefore repentance from it is obligatory upon him. Both views are false, because repentance from one thing is not repentance from another, and it has been established that the cause is other than the consequent; moreover, the cause may exist while the consequent does not come into existence due to an impediment that prevents it.

141 — Discourse on the Additions in the Subtle Matters: Discourse on Bodies: Are their essences perceived, or their accidents, or both together?

And I say: perception occurs with the essences of bodies and the very entities of colors and modes of being (*akwān*). This is because the soul acquires knowledge of the existence of that which departs toward directions by sensory perception, whereas it is not valid for accidents to depart toward directions just as one may perceive a thing as we have described, so too one may perceive in it that which contracts the vision and expands it, and perceive that which is

in its place and that which departs from it. There is no difference between one who claims that perception pertains only to colors and modes of being and not to substances and bodies, and one who inverts the proposition and claims that perception pertains only to bodies and not to those others. Rather, the statement of this latter group is closer [to the truth], because many rational people have doubted the existence of accidents, whereas none of them has doubted the existence of bodies even if some have claimed that bodies are composed of accidents. This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of rational inquiry, though a group among them has opposed it.

142 — Discourse on Bodies: Is it valid that all of them move by the movement of some of them?

And I say: that is not valid, just as it is not valid that all of them become black by the blackness of some of them, nor become white, nor come together, nor disperse. This is because that which moves is that which traverses two places, and it is impossible for that which remains stationary to be one that traverses. This is the doctrine of a large group among the people of rational inquiry, though many of them have opposed it; and it is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and others among the early authorities.

143 — Discourse on the Heavy Body Is it valid for it to remain suspended in thin air without attachment or support?

And I say: that is impossible; it is neither valid nor tenable. Affirming it leads to the conjunction of contraries. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and a group of the Muʿtazilah and most of the early authorities. The Basrans among the Muʿtazilah opposed them; and it has been related that none among the Muʿtazilah opposed this view except al-Jubbāʾī, his son, and their followers.

144 — Discourse on the Single Part Is it valid that two motions exist in it at one time?

And I say: that is impossible and not valid, because the existence of a single motion necessitates the body's departure from its place to what is adjacent to it. Thus, if two motions were to exist in it, the statement would not be free of one of two possibilities: either that it traverses two places in a single state which is impossible or that it traverses by one of them while the other has no effect, which is also invalid and impossible. There is no meaning to the claim of one who says that its effect is the speed of its traversing the place, for speed pertains only to the succession of traversing places, not to a single traversal of a single place. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim and a large group among the people of rational inquiry; a faction of the Mu'tazilah and a group among the people of ignorance have opposed it.

145 — Discourse on the Body Is it valid for it to move without a mover?

And I say: were that valid such that motion could arise within it by origination, as the opponent claims it would then be valid for Mount Abū Qubays to remain suspended in the air by the origination of rest within it, without support or attachment. Were that valid, it would also be valid for a solid, heavy stone to rest upon delicate glass while both remain as they are, without the glass breaking; and for fire to pass through the parts of cotton while both remain as they are, without burning it. All of this is sheer ignorance that leads to every impossible corruption. To this doctrine went Abū al-Qāsim and a group of the

early authorities and many of the Mu‘tazilah. Opposing it were Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī, his son Abū Hāshim, and those who followed them.

146 — Discourse on Motions Can some of them be lighter than others?

And I say: that is impossible, in light of what I have previously stated regarding the impossibility of the existence of two motions in a single part at one time. Rather, it is only valid to say of a moving body that it is lighter than another moving body and faster; and this is not impossible with respect to bodies. This too is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim and most of the people of rational inquiry, though a group among the Dahriyyah and others opposed it.

147 — Discourse on a Person’s Refraining from What Has Not Occurred to His Mind

And I say: that is permissible, just as it is permissible for him to undertake what has not occurred to his mind. For if it were not valid to refrain from something except after its occurring to the mind, it would not be valid to do it except after that as well. Action, insofar as it is action, has no necessary attachment to knowledge nor to the occurrence of something in the mind. This is the doctrine of the majority of the people of justice (*ahl al-‘adl*). A group among them opposed it, as did the adherents of compulsion (*ahl al-jabr*).

148 — Discourse on Refraining from Being in the Tenth Place While One Is in the First

And I say: that is impossible, due to the impossibility of his being in the tenth while he is in the first. Were it valid to refrain, at a given time, from what is impossible to do at that time, it would then be valid to have power, at that time, over what it is impossible to have power over with respect to its opposite and this is false by the consensus of the people of justice. There is no disagreement among the majority of those we have named regarding what we have stated, even though some anomalous individuals among them opposed it, as we have described.

149 — Discourse on Knowledge and Pain Is it valid for them to inhere in the dead, or not?

And I say: that is impossible and not permissible, and knowledge of its impossibility is close to the immediate intuitions of reason. For if it were permissible for there to exist a dead being who knows and feels pain, it would then be permissible for there to exist one who is capable, experiencing pleasure, and choosing. Were that valid, there would be no distinction between the living and the dead, and it would not be impossible for something to be moving and at rest, white and black, living and dead at the same time. All of this is manifestly impossible and clearly corrupt. Upon this doctrine there is consensus among the people of rational inquiry despite their differing schools, except for some anomalous individuals who, by their deviation from it, have been attributed to sophistry and ignorance.

150 — Discourse on Knowledge of Colors Is it valid for it to be created in the heart of the blind person, or not?

And I say: that is impossible and not valid, just as it is impossible for a rational person to be devoid of knowledge of a body while it exists and the ray of his sight has reached it without any barrier between them; and just as it is not valid for knowledge of inferential matters (*al-must* فبطات) to exist in the heart of one who is incapable of inference due to the absence and loss of its evidences. Likewise, it is impossible for knowledge of colors to exist in one who has lost that which mediates between the rational person and knowledge of colors from among the senses. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim and many of the people of *tawhīd*. A group of the Muʿtazilah and all the anthropomorphists opposed them in this matter.

151 — Discourse on One Who Looks Beyond the World or Its Extent

And I say: it is not valid for a hand, or anything else, to extend beyond the world, since that which goes out can only go out by motion, and the moving thing cannot move except in a place. And there is nothing beyond the world that exists such that it could be a place or other than a place. And if motion of anything to outside the world is not valid, then seeing what is beyond the world is also not valid, because vision only occurs with respect to something existent whose vision is possible by the connection of the ray to it or to its locus. And there is nothing existent beyond the world indeed, nothing known, let alone existent. This is the doctrine of Abū al-Qāsim and all the people of rational inquiry in one of the two divisions namely, vision and his doctrine is also the doctrine of the majority of the people of *tawhīd* regarding motion. A small number have opposed them.

And I say: Iblīs is from the jinn specifically; he is not from the angels, nor was he ever among them. Allah (swt) says: “*Except Iblīs—he was from the jinn, so he transgressed against the command of his Lord.*” (Qur’ān 18:50) And reports have come in uninterrupted transmission from the Imāms of guidance from the family of Muḥammad (as) to that effect. This is the doctrine of all the Imāmiyyah, and of many of the Mu‘tazilah and the companions of ḥadīth.

The book Awā’il al-Maqālāt is completed.

All praise belongs to Allah, Lord of the worlds, and blessings be upon Muḥammad (saww) and his pure progeny.

This addition was extracted, and al-Shaykh al-Mufīd Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-Nu‘mān — may Allah envelop him in His mercy — was asked by the noble sayyid, possessor of the two lineages, Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. the most noble, pure, unique al-Sharīf Abū Aḥmad al-Mūsawī — may Allah sanctify his soul — that it be added to Awā’il al-Maqālāt.

In the Name of Allah, the All-Merciful, the Most Merciful

153 — Discourse on ‘Iṣmah: What Is It?

I say: *‘Iṣmah* in the origin of the language is that by which a person seeks protection from something, as though he were thereby prevented from falling into what he dislikes. It is not a genus among the genera of action. From it comes their saying, “So-and-so sought protection (*i taṣama*) in the mountain,” meaning that he fortified himself by it; and from it the term *al-‘iṣm* is used, which refers to the mountain goats, due to their fortifying themselves by the mountains.

‘Iṣmah from Allah (swt) is the *tawfīq* by which a person is safeguarded from what he dislikes when he performs obedience. This is like our giving a drowning man a rope so that he may cling to it and be saved. If he grasps it and seeks protection by it, that thing is called an *‘iṣmah* for him by which he clung and was saved from drowning. Had he not clung to it, it would not have been called an *‘iṣmah*. Likewise is the case with *al-luṭf*: if a person obeys, it is called *tawfīq* and *‘iṣmah*; and if he does not obey, it is not called *tawfīq* nor *‘iṣmah*.

Allah (swt) has clarified this meaning in His Book by His saying: “*So hold fast to the rope of Allah, all together.*” The rope of Allah is His religion. Do you not see that by complying with His command they are safeguarded from falling into His punishment? Thus, their holding fast to His command became *i tiṣām*, and Allah’s *luṭf* to them in obedience became *‘iṣmah*. Therefore, all

believers among the angels, the prophets, and the Imāms are *ma'ṣūm*, because they hold fast to obedience to Allah, (swt).

This is a concise statement concerning *ʿiṣmah*, regarding the reality of which I do not think anyone disagrees. Disagreement pertains only to its ruling : how it is obligatory, and in what manner it occurs. That has already been mentioned in the chapter on the *ʿiṣmah* of the prophets and the *ʿiṣmah* of our Prophet upon him and upon them be prayers and peace at the beginning of the book. This chapter ought to be added to the discussion among the major topics, if Allah (swt) so wills.

154 — Discourse on the Matter that the Prophet (saww), after Allah singled him out with prophethood, was complete and proficient in writing

I say: When Allah (swt) made His Prophet (saww) one who gathered all the traits of perfection and all the qualities of merit, He did not leave him deficient in any rank by which perfection is soundly attained and virtue is fully assembled. Writing is a virtue: whoever is granted it is ennobled, and whoever is deprived of it is deficient.

The evidence for this is that Allah (swt) appointed the Prophet (saww) as a judge among creation in everything over which they differ; therefore, it is necessary that He teach him the rulings therein. It has been established that most of the affairs of creation are connected to writing: by it rights are affirmed, blood liabilities are cleared, proofs are established, debts are preserved, and lineages are safeguarded. It is a merit by which one adorned with it is distinguished over one deprived of it. Thus, when it is sound that Allah glorified is His name appointed His Prophet as we have described with respect to judgment and virtue, it is established that he was knowledgeable of writing and proficient in it.

There is another consideration: if the Prophet were not proficient in writing and did not know it, he would be in need, for understanding what is contained in documents of contracts and the like, of some of his subjects. If it were

permissible that Allah render him in need, in some of what he was charged to judge, of some of his subjects, it would likewise be permissible that He render him in need, in all that he was charged to judge, of others besides him. This is incompatible with his attributes and contrary to the wisdom of the One who sent him. Thus it is established that he (saww) was proficient in writing.

There is yet another proof, namely the saying of Allah (swt): *“He it is Who sent among the unlettered a Messenger from among them, reciting to them His signs, purifying them, and teaching them the Book and the wisdom, though before that they were surely in manifest error.”* (Qur’ān 62:2) It is impossible that he teach them the Book while he is not proficient in it, just as it is impossible that he teach them wisdom while he does not know it. There is no meaning to the claim of one who says: “The Book here is the Qur’ān only,” since the wording is general, and generality does not depart from its scope except with evidence especially according to the position of the Mu‘tazilah and most of the ḥadīth scholars.

This is further indicated by His saying, (swt): *“You did not recite before it any Book, nor did you write it with your right hand; otherwise the falsifiers would have doubted.”* (Qur’ān 29:48) Thus He negated from him proficiency in writing and inscribing it before prophethood specifically, thereby necessitating his proficiency in it after prophethood. Had this not been so, there would have been no intelligible meaning to specifying the negation. If his state (saww) regarding lack of knowledge of writing after prophethood were the same as his state before it, then, when intending to negate that from him, it would have been obligatory to negate it with wording that conveys it without entailing its opposite such as saying: “You did not recite before it any Book, nor did you write it with your right hand at that time, nor do you do so now,” or to say: “You are not proficient in writing and do not perform it at any time.” Just as, when He deprived him of poetry and prevented it from him, He negated it from him with wording encompassing all times, saying: *“We did not teach him poetry, nor does it befit him.”* (Qur’ān 36:69)

Since the matter is as we have explained, it is established that he (saww) was proficient in writing after Allah (swt) granted him prophethood, as we have described. This is the doctrine of a group among the Imāmiyyah; the rest of them and all other schools and sects oppose it, reject it, and deny it.

155 — What is to be added to the discussion on subtle matters (al-laṭīf) Discourse on sensory perception

I say: All sensation occurs through contact between that by which sensation is effected and the sensed object either by its direct contact with it, or with what is connected to it, or with what is separated from it, or with what is connected to that which is separated from it. This is like vision: its ray must necessarily connect with the visible object, or with what is separated from it, or with what is connected to that which is separated from it. Were it to perceive without any connection, then a screen or barrier would cause no harm, darkness would cause no harm, and the presence or absence of such things would be equal with respect to the occurrence of knowledge.

If someone were to say: *Does the ray of vision connect with Jupiter and Saturn despite their distance?*

It is said to him: No. Rather, it connects with the ray separated from them, so the two become like a single thing due to their homogeneity and resemblance.

As for sound: when it arises in the first layer of air adjacent to the colliding bodies, and likewise in the air following it, and so on, until it is generated in the air adjacent to the auditory canal, the hearer perceives it.

What indicates this is that the fuller strikes a cloth upon a stone: one sees the cloth making contact with the stone, and then the sound reaches [the ear] afterward. This indicates what we have said that it is generated in air after air until it is generated in the air adjacent to the auditory canal.

As for smell: subtle particles separate from the fragrant body and disperse through the air. Whatever of them reaches the nasal cavity that is close to the location of the fragrant body is perceived.

As for taste: it is the perception of what dissolves from a body and mixes with the moisture of the tongue and the uvulae. Therefore, no taste is found in that from which nothing dissolves, such as rubies, glass, and the like. There is no disagreement that taste and smell occur only through contact.

Touch, in reality, is the seeking of a thing in order to feel and perceive it, and its reality is sensation itself.

This is a summary of the doctrine held by Abū al-Qāsim al-Balkhī and the majority of the People of Justice (Ahl al-‘Adl). Abū Hāshim al-Jubbā’ī disagrees in some of its points.

156 — Discourse on ijtihād and qiyas

I say: ijtihād and qiyās with respect to newly occurring matters are not valid for the mujtahid nor for the one who employs analogy. Rather, for every occurrence that arises, a text (naṣṣ) from the Truthful Ones (as) comes upon it, by which judgment is made regarding it, and one does not go beyond it to anything else. Thus have come the sound reports and the clear transmitted traditions from them (as). This is the doctrine particular to the Imāmiyyah, and the majority of the theologians and the jurists of the regions oppose it.

This is the last of what was spoken by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Raḍī (rz). And blessings be upon Muḥammad, the unlettered Prophet (saww), and upon his family, abundantly and purely.

With this, the translation of Awā'il al-Maqālāt comes to an end. It was completed on Saturday, 4 Sha'bān 1447 AH. By the hands of sinful servant of Allah(swt), Sarim Jafri.